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 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Foreign investments have many benefits; most of which are dependent on the kind of 
investment.1  For host countries, the expected benefits which would arise from their 
perspectives include, but are not limited to; technology, knowledge and skills transfer.2 
Apart from these non-monetary benefits; more directly, a country benefits from increase in 
job opportunities,3  increased competition,4 and in some cases, increased economic 
stimulus.5 Where greenfield investments are set up, the host country also stands to benefit 
in terms of infrastructural development. Also, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been said 
to be resilient in times of financial crises.6 For example, in East Asia, between1997-98, FDI 
remained stable as opposed to the down-ward spiralling of portfolio investments.7
                                                          
1 There are two types of investments, namely foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investments. 
Foreign direct investment involves cross-border movements of capital into another country, establishing a 
lasting interest in an enterprise that is resident in another economy. See Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (2008) 17. Portfolio 
investments covers equity and debt securities, and does not involve any control or management of the 
business. See Maffry A ‘Direct versus Portfolio Investment in Balance of Payments’ (1954) 44 The American 
Economic Review 614. 
2 Committee for Economic Development Transitional Corporations and Developing Countries: New Policies for 
a Changing World (1981) as noted and cited by Salacuse JW The Laws of International Investment Law (2013) 
18. 
3 Feldstein M ‘Aspects of Global Economic Integration: Outlook for the Future’ 2000 Cambridge Massachusetts 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper as noted by Loungani P and Razin A ‘How Beneficial is 
FDI for Developing Countries’ (2001) 38 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Finance and Development 
Quarterly Magazine.  
4 Feldstein as noted by Loungani & Razin (2001). 
5 According to Feldstein, capital inputs which would otherwise not be attained through financial investments of 
trade in goods and services there by contributing to the economy. See Feldstein M ‘Aspects of Global 
Economic Integration: Outlook for the Future’ 2000 Cambridge Massachusetts National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper. 
6 Other findings however have pointed how FDI components have been negatively affected since 2007 when 
there was a global financial crisis, see Petersen Institute for International Economics Working Paper (2011) 2-3. 
7 Loungani P and Razin A ‘How Beneficial is FDI for Developing Countries’ (2000) 38 International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Finance and Development Quarterly Magazine available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/loungani.htm (accessed on 25 March 2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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To mitigate the current downward economic spiral,8 Zimbabwe needs to do more to attract 
foreign investments. Capital inflows from FDI9 are paramount because of the ability to 
reposition functioning sectors of the economy such as mining, manufacturing, agriculture 
and diversify the economy into newer opportunities.10 This would entail revisiting how 
investors are protected. The law makers would have to consider investor shunning 
behaviour such as the land reform programme, disregard of investors’ property rights11 and 
Zimbabwe’s indigenisation policy as codified through the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act.12. There is therefore a need for a sound regulatory approach to the 
treatment and protection of foreign investors in Zimbabwe through the use of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). This aids in creation of legal certainty which is an important 
ingredient for the inflow of investment.13 However, BITs have challenges particularly with 
                                                          
8 Zimbabwe on downward spiral, see Mail & Guardian Africa  ‘Zimbabwe economy still on downward spiral, as 
Mugabe signs law to stop mass lay-offs’ 28 August 2015 available at http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-08-28-
zimbabwe-still-on-downward-spiral-as-mugabe-signs-law-to-stop-mass-lay-offs  (accessed 25 March 2017). 
9 Foreign capital inflows to finance investments in Zimbabwe was aided by reform. The Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ) moved to allow investors to finance their projects using debt as compared to previously when 
the debt to be injected for greenfield investments had to be equal to equity. See Business Reporter ‘RBZ 
increases greenfield projects debt threshold’ The Herald Zimbabwe  available at http://www.herald.co.zw/rbz-
increases-greenfield-projects-debt-threshold/  (accessed 25 March 2017) 
10 See generally Treasury of Zimbabwe ‘Pre-Budget Strategy Paper for 2017’ available at 
http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/index.php/investment-promotion-files (accessed 25 March 2017). Zimbabwe 
needs foreign investment to aid in creating employment, which has remained elusive to date. See generally 
Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (Zimstat), stating unemployment to be at 11.3%, available at 
http://www.zimstat.co.zw/ (accessed 25 March 2017), although other reports claim unemployment to be 
higher. For example, in the ruling party’s political manifesto of 2013 states unemployment to be at 60%, while 
Zimstat has no 2013 data to confirm to the same. See also Chiumia S ‘Is Zimbabwe’s unemployment rate 4%, 
60% or 95%? Why the data is unreliable’ available at https://africacheck.org/reports/is-zimbabwes-
unemployment-rate-4-60-or-95-why-the-data-is-unreliable/ (accessed 13 March 2017).  
11 Campbell and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe 2009 (SADC (T) 03/2009) SADCT 1. 
12 Under section 3 of this Act, investors are obliged to cede 51% of equity ownership to indigenous 
Zimbabweans. 
13 It is however important to note that there are other empirical studies that show that there is no correlation 
between Investment Agreements and the inflow of investments. See for example; Hallward-Driemeier M ‘Do 
bilateral investment treaties attract FDI? Only a bit and they could bite’ 2003 World Bank Policy Research 
Paper WPS 3121 and Tobin J and Rose-Ackerman S ‘Foreign direct investment and the business environment in 
developing countries: The impact of bilateral investment treaties’ 2004 Yale Law School Centre for Law, 
Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 293. However, there is another school of thought whose 
authors point to a correlation between FDI and investment regulation. See for example; Neumayer E and Spess 
L ‘Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?’ 2005 World 
Development and Salacuse JW and Sullivan NP ‘Do BITs really work? An evaluation of bilateral investment 
treaties and their grand bargain’ in Sauvant KP and Sachs LE The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (2004). See 
generally   Zenda C ‘Zimbabwe needs to do more to attract investment’ available at  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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regard to striking the much needed balance between interests of the host state and 
investor.14  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM  
 
Investment in Zimbabwe is regulated by domestic law,15 treaty law,16 customary 
international law17 and international instruments Zimbabwe has ratified.18  Domestically, 
the Zimbabwe Investment Authority Act19 (ZIA Act), establishing the investment authority, is 
primarily responsible for ensuring that inward bound investments are licensed and are 
treated in co-ordinated fashion.20 Equally important is the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act (IEEA) and its Regulations, which provide that all companies must cede 
51 per cent of their ownership to indigenous Zimbabweans, thereby creating multiple issues 
regarding ownership.21 The afore-mentioned documents are also supported by other 
instruments such as the; Exchange Control Act,22 Immigration Act,23 Indigenisation Act,24 
Joint Venture Act,25 Special Economic Zones Act,26 amongst others. As can be noted, at a 
domestic level, the laws governing investment are quite fragmented and unfocused.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/zimbabwe-needs-to-do-more-to-attract-investmentbmi/ (accessed 7 March 
2017). 
14 There will be  discussion of this position in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
15 Zimbabwe Investment Authority Act [CHAPTER 14:30] Act no. 4 of 2006. 
16 Sibanda G ‘Zimbabwe: Govt signs 54 Trade pacts’ available at http://www.bilaterals.org/?zimbabwe-govt-
signs-54-trade-pacts (accessed 25 March 2017). See also Investment Policy Hub, Zimbabwe Bilateral 
Investment Treaties available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/233 (accessed on 25 
March 2017). 
17 As per constitution of Zimbabwe, Article 326 of Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013. 
18 For example, Zimbabwe acceded to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency in 1989, see generally 
‘Business Law Handbook: Strategic Information and Basic Laws on Zimbabwe’ 2012 International Business 
Publications, USA. 
19 [Chapter 14:30] Act no. 4 of 2006. 
20 Section 7 of Zimbabwe Investment Authority Act. 
21 Section 3 of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act.  
22 [Chapter 22:05] Act no. 6 of 2006 which governs issues to do with exchange of transactions, regulations of 
imports and exports, foreign currency, transfer of property, securities and transactions relating thereto. Such 
provisions are applicable to investments. 
23 [Chapter 4:02] Act no. 22 0f 2001 supported by Statutory Instrument 78 of 1987 which regulates entry of 
persons, otherwise being investors 
24 [Chapter 14:33] Act 14 of 2007 which articulates share ownership of a foreign company and sets a limit of 
such ownership to 49%. 
25 [Chapter 22:22] Act no. 6 of 2015 providing for implementation of partnerships with government 
enterprises. 
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Customary international law also influences investment law in Zimbabwe to the extent in 
which it is consistent with the Constitution itself.27 It reads; 
“(1) Customary international law is part of the law of Zimbabwe, unless it is inconsistent 
with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
(2) When interpreting legislation, every court and tribunal must adopt any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with customary international law 
applicable in Zimbabwe in preference to an alternative interpretation inconsistent with 
that law.”28 
In terms of treaty law, Zimbabwe is a party to 54 bilateral investment treaties (BITs),29 10 of 
which are in force.30 The problem with these treaties is that they are first generation BITs.31 
These have been highly debated owing to their lopsided nature, to which there has been 
suggestion of balancing rights and obligations of investors and host states.32 The debates 
and discussions have seen the International Investment Agreement (IIA) regime, undergo 
reform with an expansion of obligations of investors,33 and more elaborate texts that are 
evasive due? to loose language.34 In this respect, Zimbabwe has not fared particularly well. 
All of its investment treaties are first generation BITs which provide more rights than 
obligations and grappled with unexplained clauses, similar in structure and language.35  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
26 [Chapter 14:34] Act no. 7 of 2016 creating special economic zones as well as considerations for investment 
licences for the investors intending to invest in the zone. 
27 Section 326 of Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013. 
28  Section 326 of Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
29 Sibanda G ‘Zimbabwe: Govt signs 54 trade pacts’ available at  http://www.bilaterals.org/?zimbabwe-govt-
signs-54-trade-pacts (accessed on 25 March 2017). 
30 Investment Policy Hub, Zimbabwe Bilateral Investment Treaties available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/233 (accessed on 25 March 2017). 
31 These are BITs that are traditional in the approach of investment regulation, focusing mainly on protection 
of investors, awarding rights to investors and obligations to the host state. See generally Schill SW The 
Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009) 90-91. 
32 There have been different literature that speaks to the need of balancing rights and obligations of state 
parties and investors. See part 2.5 of this thesis for a more detailed literature in that regard. Apart from a 
preposition to balance interests, states like Canada and India have model treaties that derogate from the 
traditional structure of BITs. See Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
33 Bottini ‘Strengthening the Global Trade and Investment System for Sustainable Development’ 2015 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum Think Piece  2-
3, available at http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/E15-Investment-Bottini-FINAL.pdf  
(accessed on 25 March 2017). 
34Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEDC) ‘Investment Treaties over Time - Treaty 
Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment February 
2015 available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2015-02.pdf (accessed 25 March 
2017) 37-40. 
35 See Chapter 3 of this thesis, where a detailed analysis is undertaken. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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In the view of this thesis, substantive clauses that are problematic include36 the national 
treatment clause, the most-favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full 
protection and security and indirect expropriation.37 In Zimbabwe’s in-force BITs, these 
clauses are shy of clear, precise meaning, leaving room for wide interpretation which may 
be to the detriment of Zimbabwe as a host state.38 For example, the fair and equitable 
treatment clause in the Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT is neither linked to customary 
international law39 nor given meaning as in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
Agreement (CETA).40 
Apart from substantive provisions, another important issue that arises in the Zimbabwean 
context, as well as generally, is that of limited host state policy space.41 This distinctive issue 
finds itself absent in Zimbabwe’s BITs. Policy space is not expressly provided for in these 
texts. This has severe implications for the government especially with regard to 
enforcement of social economic transformation and its related policy. The increase of 
investor-state disputes precipitated by the exercise of state police powers when regulating 
domestic affairs, raises the need to balance investor’s rights and host country’s policy space 
and regulatory flexibility.42 
                                                          
36 However, there are other clauses which are problematic including the dispute settlement clause and 
repatriation of funds clause. See Valenti M ‘The Scope of an Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution Clause: It is 
Not Just a Question of Interpretation’ (2013) 29 Arbitration International and Reinisch A ‘How Narrow are 
Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment Treaties’ (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement, Lang J & Gilfillan B ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties – Shield or Sword?’ available at 
http://www.bowmanslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PPI-article_mailshot_08112013_1038389_1-
1.pdf (accessed 17 August 2017) 3. 
37 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Investor State Dispute Settlement 
Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review’ available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf 
(accessed 25 March 2017) 32-41. These clause will be discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
38 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
39 As done in the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership 
(2006), under article 91. 
40 Article 8.10 (2) of Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the 
European Union signed 30 October 2016 available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 3 May 2017). 
41 The BITs that Zimbabwe is party to, are silent to guarantees or considerations of policy space. Surprisingly, 
Zimbabwe – South Africa BIT for example, has no reference to policy space particularly towards economic 
empowerment laws to which both countries have fervent policies and laws for; namely Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act for Zimbabwe and Black Economic and Empowerment. See also ‘regulatory chill’ 
echoed by Spears SA ‘The Quest For Policy Space In A New Generation Of International Investment 
Agreements’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1040. See generally Miles K The Origions of 
International Investment Law: Empire Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital (2013) 
42 Yu & Marshall (2008) 2-3 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Notably, host countries’ interests underlying in sustainable development and responsible 
business conduct have been recognised in recent IIAs.43 Yu and Marshall opine that there is 
now a trend which developing countries have especially adopted to ensure FDI policies are 
geared and otherwise consistent with their national development goals.44 This would be a 
trend Zimbabwe would find beneficial to catch onto, as the government is enjoined to 
provide for by the new transformative constitution.45 
An important characteristic of BITs is the guarantee of protection of investors and their 
investments through clauses such as fair and equitable treatment as well as compensation 
where expropriation has taken place.46 However, these clauses have contributed immensely 
to the position that the IIA regulatory regime is unbalanced.47 To this, renegotiation of 
current BITs as well as new direction on future BITs would, arguably, balance the much 
needed promotion and protection of investments against the needs of the host state. Such a 
balance would depend on how each country is poised with foreign investments. For 
Zimbabwe, the tarnished image of investor treatment48 among other factors should be of 
                                                          
43 Gordon K ‘Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable Development and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact 
Finding Survey’ 2014 OECD Working Papers on International Investment 8-9 
44 Yu V & Marshall F ‘Investor Obligations and Host State Policy Space’ 2008 2nd Annual Forum of Developing 
Country Investment Negotiators IISD working paper Marrakesh 1-2. Ecuador is a practical example of states 
moving away from BITs, noting issues of development agendas being undermined in these texts. See Uribe D 
‘Ecuador withdraws from its remaining investment treaties’ SOUTHNEWS 23 May 2017 available at 
http://mailchi.mp/southcentre/southnews-basic-statement-on-climate-change-222505?e=e185515255 
(accessed 14 June 2017). 
45 National objective of empowerment articulated under article 14 of Constitution of Zimbabwe. Interestingly, 
Carim X ‘International Investment Agreements and Africa’s Structural Transformation: A perspective from 
South Africa’ Investment Policy Brief (2015), points to the fact that such transformative measures are further 
supported by structural measures.  These in essence form part of development measures, which have seen 
countries such as South Africa terminate BITs and opting to govern foreign investments with a standalone 
investment act (the Protection of Investment Act).   
46 Sauvant K P & Sachs L E ‘The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows’ 2009 Oxford Scholarship Online as cited by Wagner M 
‘Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law’ (2015) 36 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 12-13  
47 Salacuse J W ‘Towards a Global Treaty for Investment Protection? Lessons from the Failure of OECD’s MAI’ 
(2004) 75 noting ‘power asymmetries’ that exist between capital exporting and capital importing countries in 
negotiating BITs , see also Morin and Gagne ‘What Can Best Explain the Prevalence of Bilateralism in the 
Investment Regime?’ (2007) 36 International Journal of Political Economy 54-55  
48 Thornycroft P and Laing A ‘Land grabs’ The Telegraph 28 February 2015 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/active/11442408/Zimbabwes-white-farmers-targeted-for-new-Mugabe-land-
grabs.html (accessed 26 March 2017.)  Further to this, ‘non-compliance with SADC Tribunal award in Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008) which led 
to the review of SADC tribunal and subsequently changing its mandate to deal with state-state disputes 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/13.html (accessed 26 March 2017) 
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consideration in suggesting the appropriate provision to employ in critical areas such as 
standard of treatment, indirect expropriation and compensation. 
Zimbabwe should revisit its BITs and renegotiate to highlight the changing times by 
balancing the rights and obligations of investors and state parties. Particularly for 
Zimbabwe, its fervent policy on indigenisation has to be articulated in its BITs under the 
national treatment clause, so that a tribunal presiding over an investment dispute would 
take note of such policy considerations in adjudicating an investment dispute. Apart from 
the national treatment clause, traditional clauses that award protection to the investor have 
been revisited by countries like Canada and India.49 Clauses such as the fair and equitable 
treatment, most-favoured nation treatment, full security and protection, and indirect 
expropriation have undergone changes in structure, with countries opting for more 
elaborate provisions. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This thesis examines the question: whether or not it is necessary to revisit Zimbabwe’s BITs 
with the intention of balancing rights and obligations of investors and state parties.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
(i) To examine the history of BITs and typical BIT clauses; 
 
(ii) To examine and analyse old or first generation BITs Zimbabwe is a party to 
especially in light of the problems of some of the clauses; 
 
(iii) To assess the practicality of articulating and enhancing  policy space in BITs; 
 
                                                          
49 This has been seen by more elaborate Model BITs and treaty practice of the two countries. See Chapter 4 for 
a more detailed discussion.  
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(iv) To determine if Zimbabwe can draw lessons from other countries in terms of 
drafting BITs; 
 
(v) To propose recommendations towards balancing the interests of the investor 
and Zimbabwe as the host state. 
 
 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The central problem that this thesis grapples with is that of the inherent challenges that 
Zimbabwe’s first generation BITs are fraught with. To begin, these treaties are characterised 
by loose language which creates the leeway for potential misinterpretation. Furthermore, 
existent in the treaties are controversial provisions such as the fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) standard and the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause which have been at the centre of 
numerous arbitral cases. In these cases, developing countries were exposed to huge awards 
which they can little afford. Finally, Zimbabwe’s BITs do not cater for empowerment 
agendas, akin to the exercise of the right to regulate, which are an important mantle in 
Zimbabwe’s new Constitution. It is against this background that it becomes important to 
resolve the challenges in Zimbabwe’s BITs because: (1) it accords with the transformative 
agenda of Zimbabwe’s Constitution, (2) it moves in line with the new mantra in international 
investment law of balancing the rights and obligations of investors and host-states, (3) it 
eliminates potential exposure to insensitive arbitral claims, and (4) it clarifies poor drafting 
in existing treaties.   
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY  
 
This research is a desktop study which is based on various primary and secondary sources. In 
terms of primary sources, the research will examine and interrogate various Acts, 
regulations and policies. As regards secondary sources, a review of journal articles, internet 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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sources, position papers and other scholarly material will be conducted. In doing so, this 
thesis will use a combination of research methodologies. More specifically, the thesis will 
adopt a legal historical method. This method traces the history of law and its 
development.50 Further to this, it includes an analysis of the rules of law in light of the 
external legal history, namely economic and political developments among other things.51 
The purpose of legal historical research is to establish the developments of legal rules and 
propose amendments to existing law based on historical facts.52 This study therefore follows 
a similar pattern by analysing investment regulation during colonial times and particularly 
post-colonial period for Latin America and other parts of the world. The history is critical in 
understanding how the law of bilateral investment treaties came about. 
While a comparative approach will not be utilised, the thesis does, however, draw lessons 
from other jurisdictions. Two countries in particular are selected for this purpose. These are, 
namely; Canada and India. Canada is a useful country to draw lessons from because, in 
terms of investments, Canada has set itself as a friendly investment destination. This is 
particularly espoused in its forward thinking BIT templates which seek to rethink the 
structure of current BITs. India, makes a good jurisdiction to draw lessons from, as in the 
past, just like Zimbabwe, it grappled with the issue of empowerment. This led to decreased 
investment levels and investor apathy.  Interestingly, however, India has managed to turn 
around its investment climate and, similar to Canada, it has also constructed some 
progressive Model BITs to take its investment into the future. The thesis will also draw 
lessons from the SADC FIP and Model BIT as these are influential texts on Zimbabwe since it 
is a member state of SADC. Finally, the thesis will also draw lessons from EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) which makes up part of 
international best practices because it is one of the newer agreements on international 
investment. 
                                                          
50 Du Plessis W ‘A Self Help Guide Research Methodology and Dissertation Writing’ 2007 available at 
http://www.puk.ac.za/opencms/export/PUK/html/fakulteite/regte/pdf/Du_Plessis_Research_Methodology_FI
NAL.pdf (accessed 17 August 2017) 30. 
51 Du Plessis W ‘A Self Help Guide Research Methodology and Dissertation Writing’ 2007 available at 
http://www.puk.ac.za/opencms/export/PUK/html/fakulteite/regte/pdf/Du_Plessis_Research_Methodology_FI
NAL.pdf (accessed 17 August 2017) 30. 
52 Du Plessis W ‘A Self Help Guide Research Methodology and Dissertation Writing’ 2007 available at 
http://www.puk.ac.za/opencms/export/PUK/html/fakulteite/regte/pdf/Du_Plessis_Research_Methodology_FI
NAL.pdf (accessed 17 August 2017) 31. 
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1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
  
This study is limited to only BITs and will not assess national legislation that regulates 
foreign investments in Zimbabwe. However, the Indigenisation Act and Procurement Act will 
be discussed to the extent that they influence BITs. In the Zimbabwean BITs to be discussed 
in this study, focus will be on five substantive provisions, namely national treatment, most-
favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and 
indirect expropriation. While other provisions like dispute settlement are problematic,53 the 
writer opines that such problems are secondary. Essentially, the primary problems of BITs lie 
in the substantive provisions and subsequently create problems for dispute settlement and 
practice. As such, matters of dispute settlement will not be addressed in this thesis. The 
repatriation of funds clause is, to an extent, problematic considering issues like balance of 
payment of a country in which investments are undertaken.54 This clause will not make up 
part of this study as it is neither widely debated nor highly contested compared to the 
substantive provisions in BITs noted above. Notwithstanding the above, the mini thesis 
word limit was also an inhibiting factor for a further discussion on aforementioned issues. 
Although these clauses will not be discussed in detail, they will make up part of the 
proposed full model BIT for Zimbabwe as presented in an annexure at the end of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53  See Valenti M ‘The Scope of an Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution Clause: It is Not Just a Question of 
Interpretation’ (2013) 29 Arbitration International and Reinisch A ‘How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement 
Clauses in Investment Treaties’ (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Lang J & Gilfillan B 
‘Bilateral Investment Treaties – Shield or Sword?’ available at http://www.bowmanslaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/PPI-article_mailshot_08112013_1038389_1-1.pdf (accessed 17 August 2017) 3. 
 
54 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Transfer of Funds’  UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in International Investment Agreements 200 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/psiteiitd20.en.pdf 
(accessed 21 August 2017) 43-48. 
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1.8 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS  
 
Chapter 1 
Chapter one is the introduction to the mini thesis. It consists of the background to the 
research, research questions, research objectives, significance of the study, methodology 
adopted by the research and an outline of chapters. 
 
Chapter 2  
The second chapter will examine the history of BITs, their problems and the emergence of 
the balancing theory. 
 
Chapter 3  
This chapter analyses Zimbabwe’s BITs, particularly the nine BITs currently in force. Under 
this chapter, the study will identify the problems with the structure of these BITs. Moreover, 
the chapter will identify policies that are of interest to Zimbabwe as a host state and 
possible problematic clauses in current BITs in pursuing state interests. 
 
Chapter 4  
In chapter four, the research will examine how Canada, India, SADC FIP and Model BIT, and 
CETA have addressed problems of BITs. Furthermore, an analysis of these modern templates 
is undertaken and there will be an assessment on the viability of enhancing policy space in 
BITs.  
 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion and recommendations; proposals for balancing the interests will be presented in 
this chapter 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Annexure 
Under this section, there is a proposed model BIT for Zimbabwe.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORY OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE BALANCING 
THEORY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The protection of investors is, amongst other measures, guaranteed by BITs.55 BITs make up 
part of the IIA regime and have a history dating back to the late 1950s, when Germany and 
Pakistan were the first two countries to conclude such an agreement.56 Since then, BITs 
have continued to grow and are the largest contributors to IIAs. For instance, in 2015, 31 
new IIAs were concluded taking the total number of IIAs to 3,304.57 Of these, 20 were BITs, 
bringing their total number to 2,946.58 This is reflective of the centrality of BITs in 
investment regulation. 
Of particular importance is the lopsided nature of BIT protection. For instance, in 2015, 85% 
of the protections in IIAs were tipped in favour of investors.59 This has resulted in the 
termination of numerous existing BITs. As an example, Indonesia terminated 8 of its BITs in 
2015,60 also sending notices for the termination of a further 10 in 2016.61 Similarly, Poland 
                                                          
55 Most investments are protected under BITs although there are trade agreements that encompass 
investment, for example, the newly signed Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
Canada and the European Union. Chapter 8 in the CETA, is an investment chapter that seeks to protect 
investments. 
56 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange of notes), Germany 
and Pakistan, 25 November 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 (entered into force 28 November 1962). 
57 UNCTAD ‘World Investment Report 2016 Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges’ available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_Overview_en.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 101. 
58 UNCTAD ‘World Investment Report 2016 Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges’ available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_Overview_en.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 101 
59 UNCTAD ‘World Investment Report 2016 Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges’ available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_Overview_en.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) xi. 
60 Peterson LE ‘Indonesia ramps up termination of BITs – and kills survival clause in one such treaty – but faces 
new $600 mil claim from Indian mining investor’ Bilaterals 20 November 2015 available at  
http://bilaterals.org/?indonesia-ramps-up-termination-of  (accessed 25 April 2017). 
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has announced its intention to cancel 23 of its BITs.62 South Africa terminated its BITs and 
opted to regulate foreign investments with an act of parliament, namely the Protection of 
Investment Act.63 Similarly, Ecuador terminated its BITs citing several challenges with the 
texts, including contradicting and undermining development objectives laid down in the 
Constitution of Ecuador.64 This shows the current dire state as regards the status of BITs in 
investment law, largely due to their unbalanced nature.  
Tipped to change the scales has been the discourse on the balancing of investors’ and host 
states’ rights and obligations.65 This discussion is central to investment law as it 
encompasses much needed tools such as the right to regulate and policy space. Accordingly, 
it is not unusual that this chapter centres on the history of BITs and the emergence of the 
balancing proposition. Structurally, the chapter will first investigate movements of capital, 
treatment and protection of investors prior to BITs. Thereafter, the chapter explores 
inherent problems of diplomatic protection and other forms of investment protection which 
subsequently led to the creation of BITs encompassing international law. To give further 
context to this argument, the chapter then analyses the balancing discourse in relation to 
BITs.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
61Widyatmoko W ‘Indonesia: The end of Bilateral Investment Treaties?’ Global Arbitration News 29 May 2015 
available at https://globalarbitrationnews.com/indonesia-the-end-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-the-end-of-
bilateral-investment-treaties-20150202/ (accessed 25 April 2017). 
62 Waldoch M & Onoszko M ‘Poland plans to cancel Bilateral Investment Treaties with EU’ Bloomberg 26 
February 2016 available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-25/poland-seeks-to-end-
bilateral-investment-deals-with-eu-members (accessed 25 April 2017). 
63 Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015. 
64 Uribe D ‘Ecuador withdraws from its remaining investment treaties’ SOUTHNEWS 23 May 2017 available at 
http://mailchi.mp/southcentre/southnews-basic-statement-on-climate-change-222505?e=e185515255 
(accessed 14 June 2017). 
65 Kingsbury B & Schill SW ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in 
the Public Interest - The Concept of Proportionality’ in Schill SW  International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (2010) 78. 
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2.2 INVESTMENT PROTECTION PRIOR TO BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES  
 
The historical origins of BITs can best be traced to the post-colonial times of developing 
countries. Before this, there was no need for an outright legal system governing 
investments.66 The rationale behind this is that, in this time, investments were protected by 
colonial laws which afforded protection to all economic activities in the colony.67 Most 
agreements, before then, focused on establishing trade relations, whilst in rare instances, 
these agreements would touch on investment related issues such a property rights.68  
Of such agreements, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) bilateral treaties were the 
forerunner to BITs.69 The substantive rights covered by FCN treaties included; navigation 
rights, trading rights, entry and establishment, and human rights overall.70 Whilst these 
rights were largely of an economic nature, they also covered issues such as the protection of 
aliens and their property.71 These treaties were aimed at securing interests of state parties’ 
nationals abroad72  and became an important practice in diplomacy.73 It was of interest to 
conclude such treaties, particularly for the US, to protect and promote investments from 
within its borders.74  
The presence of FCN treaties did contribute towards international law on investments with 
the inclusion of principles of national treatment (NT) and most favoured nation treatment 
(MFN), although not widely used at the time.75 The legal structure of treatment and 
                                                          
66 Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment (2010) 19. 
67 Sornarajah M (2010) 20. 
68 Vandevelde KJ ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ in Sachs L & Sauvant KP (eds.) The 
Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Doubles Taxation Treaties and 
Investment Flows (2009) 158. 
69 Dolzer R & Stevens M Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995) 10. 
70 Dunning JH & Ludan SM Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (2008) 311. 
71 Dunning JH & Ludan SM (2008) 311. 
72 Coyle JF ‘The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modem Era’ (2013) 51 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 305. 
73 Walker H ‘Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ as cited by Coyle JF ‘The Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modem Era’ (2013) 51 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
303.  
74 Coyle JF & Yackee JW ‘Reviving the Treaty of Friendship: Enforcing International Investment Law in U.S. 
Courts’ (2016) 49 Arizona State Law Journal 2. 
75 Dunning JH & Ludan SM (2008) 311. See generally Titi C The Right to Regulate in International Investment 
Law (2014) 53-56. 
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protection of foreign investments in the 19th and early to mid-20th century76 was, however, 
deficient regardless of the presence of FCNs.77 This is because international law at the time, 
had not established exhaustive standards of investment protection and was silent on issues 
such as repatriation.78 Such a position can be largely attributed to the fact that investments 
were made through colonial expansion during colonial rule.79 Therefore, there was no 
pressing need to have international law on foreign investment as the colonial legal systems 
were integrated with those of their colonial masters.80  
Essentially, investors at the time were content with an imperial parliament ensuring their 
investment and an imperial court adjudicating investment disputes in cases where there 
would be one arising.81 As such, customary international law was not fully developed in the 
area of investment protection and as a result it remained vague and not widely applicable.82 
This would in time create problems for capital-exporting states when newly independent 
states found its contents undesirable.  
The FCN treaties, in post-colonial period, were no saving grace as they were found to be 
undesirable instruments governing economic relations between newly independent states, 
which were predominantly developing countries, and developed states.83 This was largely 
because FCNs offered unrestricted rights of entry and an unqualified right of national 
treatment, and were therefore thought to be incompatible with the new political realities of 
                                                          
76 These timelines were selected because of their centrality in developments of BITs, as it was post-colonial 
period for the bulk of Latin American countries. Moreover, it was the period in which Germany lost the First 
World War and had to cede to the victorious powers and thus gave up its colonies and investments in them. 
See Salacuse JW The Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual, and International 
Frameworks for Foreign Capital (2013) 342, Twomey M A Century of Foreign Investment in the Third World 
(2002) 217. Investment tensions continued, especially between Latina America and the US. In 1938, the Hull 
Rule was asserted by the US as the standard in expropriation. See Wang G International Investment Law: A 
Chinese Perspective (2014) 389.  
77 Salacuse JW & Sullivan NP ‘Do BITs really Work: An Evaluation of BITs and their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 
Harvard International Law Journal 68. 
78 Salacuse JW & Sullivan NP (2005) 68-69. 
79 Sornarajah M (2010) 19. See also Sornarajah M Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign 
Investment (2015) 32. 
80 Dunning JH & Ludan SM (2008) 307. 
81 Dunning JH & Ludan SM (2008) 307. 
82 See discussion by Salacuse JW & Sullvian NP (2005) 68-70. 
83 Dolzer R & Stevens M (1995) 11. 
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developing states.84 For example, in the Nicaragua – US FCN treaty, nationals and companies 
of contracting states were given a right to engage in all sectors of the economy.85 
Eventually, the unrestricted rights of entry previously guaranteed by FCN treaties were 
denied,86 especially because of the distrust of aliens and their intentions,87 particularly 
former colonial masters of newly independent states. Distrust of aliens could be seen by the 
hostile outlook on foreign investments by third world countries, particularly Latin America.88 
In the 1900s, for example, there were expropriations and nationalisations of foreign owned 
property.89 There were conscious efforts by host states to protect culture, custom, religion 
and political institutions which stirred negative attitude towards aliens.90 Therefore, 
treatment of aliens was often unfriendly and emulated that which was given to enemies or 
outcasts.91 
In the perspective of newly independent states,92 they had sovereignty over natural 
resources.93 This perspective was met with rejection by capital exporting-states and said to 
have been an obstacle to the presence of foreign investors.94 Treatment of investors was, 
therefore, a central problem in the international community, particularly for developed 
capital-exporting states.95  The divided opinion on how investors were to be treated, had 
                                                          
84 Dolzer R & Stevens M (1995) 11.  
85 See for example Article VIII of United States of America and Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation 1956 available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20367/v367.pdf (accessed 
21 August 2017). 
86 Dunning JH & Ludan SM (2008) 161 
87  Wojnowska-Radzińska J The Right of an Alien to be Protected against Arbitrary Expulsion in International 
Law (2015) 23. 
88 Twomey MJ ‘A Century of Foreign Investment in Mexico’ UM-Dearborn Economics Working Paper 2009 
available at http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~mtwomey/econhelp/MexInv.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 4. 
89 Rubin SJ & Alexander DC (eds.) NAFTA and Investments (1995) 162. See also Bulmer-Thomas V The Economic 
History of Latin America since Independence (2014) 100-102, 243-237. 
90 See discussion by Wojnowska-Radzińska J (2015) 23-24 
91 Newcombe PA & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (2009) 3. 
92 Latin America was the first group of states to gain independence from their colonial masters, thus their 
centrality in the discussion of principles of developments of international investment law. See Subedi SP 
International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) 8-11. 
93 Subedi SP International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) 21. 
94 Qureshi AH & Ziegler AR International Economic Law (2007) 401. 
95 Qureshi AH & Ziegler AR (2007) 402.  
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some if its roots in the difference of opinion on private property rights96 between the 
traditional capital-exporting and capital-importing countries.  
The US for example, insisted on international minimum standards and thus built standards 
that were favourable to foreign investors.97 Latin American states on the other hand opined 
that foreign investors entered the host state and reasonably assumed the risks of 
investment there.98 Therefore, the treatment to be awarded to investors was that which 
nationals of the host state received.99 
The contentious relationship between Latin American countries and the US over investment 
protection was the genesis of state responsibility for the treatment of aliens.100 Such 
responsibility established international minimum standards of treatments of investors and 
their investments, and protection overall.101 State responsibility essentially gave effect to 
diplomatic protection as legitimate action to counter the ‘unfair acts’ of host states against 
aliens.102 Thus, investors in host states could invoke diplomatic protection and a state could 
be held accountable for breach of state responsibility.103  
Diplomatic protection is defined as a means by which a state takes action on behalf of its 
nationals, who have been unjustly denied their rights and interests due to an internationally 
wrongful act.104 An injurious act towards an alien was therefore actionable by the home 
state in defence of its national.105 A state thus espouses a claim for its national.106 There is a 
school of thought that puts forward that diplomatic protection was a means of securing 
interests of capital-exporting countries.107  
                                                          
96 Newly independent states were developing and some were communist states who opined that they had 
sovereignty over natural resources. Furthermore, they took the position that international law was furthering 
the interests of capitalist countries. See Shaw MN International Law (2008) 823.  
97 Sornarajah M (2010) 36. 
98 Sornarajah M (2010) 37. See also Miles K The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire Environment 
and Safeguarding of Capital (2013) 50. 
99 Sornarajah M (2010) 37. 
100 Sornarajah M (2010) 36. See also Subedi SP (2008) 11-13, 56. 
101 Miles K (2013) 47. 
102 See Borchard E ‘The Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens’ (1940) 38 Michigan Law Review 446-448 
103 Miles K (2013) 47-48. 
104 British Institute of International Comparative Law Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues. Remedies In 
International Investment Law Emerging Jurisprudence Of International Investment Law III (2009) 4. 
105 Asante SKB ‘International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal’ (1988) 37 International and 
Comparative Quarterly 590. See also Miles K (2013) 47. 
106 Newcombe & Paradell (2009) 5. 
107 Miles K (2013) 37. 
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Diplomatic protection varied from diplomatic protest to military intervention.108 An example 
of diplomatic protection is gunboat diplomacy used during colonial times as a means to 
protect commercial interests in Latin America.109 This was a means in which a state would 
mount pressure on another state for the purposes of ensuring certain demands were 
met.110 The practice took centre stage in the post-colonial times, in 1902, when it was used 
to settle an investment dispute in Venezuela.111 
It is important to restate that these states felt they were under no obligation to conform to 
standards of investment protection in customary international law,112 nor did they feel a 
need to persist with old standing arrangements that were existent during colonial times to 
protect property.113 Furthermore, minimum standards of treatment were largely based on 
US domestic law standards;114 therefore, it was argued that former colonies had been used 
as a platform to expand economic interests.115 To this, newly formed states sought to 
dismantle those economic interests.116  
The resultant effect of Pan-American117 movement on treatment of investors led to a rift in 
opinion as to the status of generally accepted western protection standards. The divide 
between these two schools of thought would soon be exacerbated by the creation of the 
Calvo Doctrine. This doctrine sought to reinforce the ideas of investor treatment by Latin 
American countries. The Calvo doctrine was formulated by an Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, 
and was premised on national treatment.118 One of the fundamentals of the Calvo doctrine 
                                                          
108 Miles K (2013) 47. See also Cable J Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval 
Force (2016) 1. 
109 See generally Graham-Yooll A Imperial Skirmishes: War and Gunboat Diplomacy in Latin America 
(2002) 91-98. 
110 Cable J (2016) 1-2.  
111 Miles K (2013) 67. Civil unrest in Venezuela between 1898-1900 saw British, German and Italian nationals 
sustain property damage. To this, Venezuela was unable to meet payment demands and this resulted in the 
blockade, with seizure of the Venezuelan fleet, sinking of gunboats and bombarding Puerto Cabello. See 
Becker Lorca A  Mestizo International Law (2014) 145-147.  
112 Sornarajah M (2015) 34-35. See also López Escarcena S Indirect Expropriation in International Law (2014) 
27. 
113 See generally Vandavelde KJ ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 University 
of California Davis Journal of International Law 166-167. 
114 Sornarajah M (2010) 36 
115 See discussion by Miles K (2013) 2, 36. 
116 Shaw (2008) 823. See also Lipson C Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (1985) 76-77. 
117 This term is used by Lipson, describing Latin American states and their treatment of aliens. See Lipson C 
Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1985) 76-80. 
118 Miles K (2013) 50. 
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maintains that no state has the right to intervene in another state by diplomatic pressure or 
military force for the purposes of private claims or debt owed to its nationals.119 This was 
especially due to unsettling diplomatic protection by capital exporting countries, which saw 
intervention in the host state.120   
Furthermore, the Calvo doctrine held the position that investment disputes were subject to 
host state courts’ jurisdiction.121 Essentially, an investor was to rely on national standards of 
treatment, local courts for investment related disputes as opposed to home state courts and 
cede the right to diplomatic protection. This doctrine was, to a large extent, motivated by 
the need to stop diplomatic protection and its intrusive tendencies in the internal affairs of 
host states.122 Latin American states were displeased with the practice of European States 
engaging in aggression against militarily and economically weaker Latin American States as a 
means of collecting debts owed to their citizens.123 
This position was however rejected by capital-exporting states.124 The US put forward a 
remedy against expropriation by asserting the Hull Rule. It came from the US Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull who wrote a letter to the Mexican government following expropriations 
of property owned by US nationals.125 The Hull Rule established fair, prompt and adequate 
compensation126 and was the expected position of Mexican expropriations of 1927.127 The 
rationale behind the Hull Rule was the practice among the global north, of prompt and 
adequate compensation when a state took an alien’s property.128  
After the failure of the Calvo Doctrine,129 Latin American efforts to develop standards of 
treatment continued. This can be evidenced in later doctrines such as the Drago Doctrine, 
                                                          
119 Atkins GP Encyclopaedia of the Inter-American System (1997) 47-48. 
120 See Miles K (2013) 50. 
121 Subedi SP (2008) 14. 
122 Miles K (2013) 50. 
123 Gathii JT ‘War ’s Legacy in International Investment Law’ (2009) 11 International Community Law Review 
355. 
124 See Tabari NM Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf (2016).  
125 Montt S State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the 
BIT Generation (2009) 56-57. 
126 Dolzer R ‘New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’ (1981) 75 The American Journal of 
International Law 558-559. See also Subedi SP (2008) 18. 
127 See Subedi SP (2008) 16-18. 
128 Lowenfeld AF International Economic Law (2008) 467. 
129 Failure with regards to being accepted by capital-exporting countries. The Calvo doctrine was otherwise 
accepted by the bulk of Latin American countries and to-date there are some treaties that do recognise the 
doctrine under Calvo Clause. See Miles K (2013) 50-52, Subedi SP (2008) 14-16. 
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which was similar to the Calvo doctrine. The Drago doctrine was devised by Luis Maria 
Drago as an immediate response to Britain, Germany and Italy blocking the port of Puerto 
Cabello for the collection of debts owed to their nationals in 1902.130 Much like the Calvo 
doctrine, the Drago doctrine was ‘non-interventionist’131 particularly by European powers in 
the Americas.132  
From the discussion above, it is clear that international investment regulation was 
fragmented. Following this, there were attempts to regulate foreign investments on a 
multilateral level. Most notably, the Havana Charter of 1948133 was one such attempt. The 
Havana Charter was intended to create the International Trade Organisation (ITO), which 
would make up part of the international economic triad consisting of the World Bank and 
the IMF.134 With the inclusion of several other things, the Havana Charter provided for 
employment and economic activity, economic development and reconstruction and set up 
the ITO.135 Under Article 12 of the Havana Charter, investment regulation is articulated 
although not exhaustively.136 It did not include provisions like minimum standards, 
compensation for expropriations which were at the core of customary international law on 
treatment of aliens.137 Thus, the Havana Charter failed for several other reasons including its 
failure to appeal to capital-exporting states by not addressing the relevant questions in 
international investment law.138 For example, with regard to protection of foreign 
investment, the Havana Charter merely set out unenforceable undertakings.139  
                                                          
130 Scafi JP The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas: Empire and Legal Networks (2017) 70. 
131 Scafi JP (2017) 70. 
132 See generally Fawcett L ‘Between West and Non-West: Latin American Contributions to International 
Thought’ (2014) 34 The International History Review as cited by Scafi JP (2017) 70. 
133 Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization 1948 available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017). 
134Appleton AE & Plummer MG (eds.) The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis 
(2007) 53. 
135 Chapter II articles 2-7, Chapter III articles 8-15 of the Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organisation 1948. 
136 See Salacuse JW The Law of Investment Treaties (2015) 96. 
137 Lowenfeld AF (2008)482-483. See also Schill S Multilateralization of International 33-34, Subedi (2008) SP 
20-21. 
138 Weiler T The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination and Minimum 
Standards of Treatment in Historical Context (2013) 213-215, Caliskan Y The Development of International 
Investment Law: Lessons from the OEDC MAI and Their Application to a Possible Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (2008) 205. 
139 Schill S The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009) 34.  
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Apart from the Havana Charter, another multilateral attempt to regulate investment was 
seen by the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). The MAI negotiations began in May of 1995,140 
primarily under the need to have transparent and fair rules on investments and investors.141 
The strategy was to conclude a multilateral agreement with high level of protection 
amongst OECD members and other willing states.142 Although there was consensus a 
general consensus on the benefits of FDI,143 there were significant differences in negotiation 
positions of the parties.144 This among other reasons saw the MAI fail and abandoned in  
1998.145 
 
2.3 EMERGENCE OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THEIR PURPOSE  
 
From the historical perspective above, it is clear that there was dire need for an 
international investment protection legal framework. Perhaps at a multilateral level, it was 
impossible owing to clashes of ideologies such as those between capitalism and 
communism.146 With the multilateral regulation process having been fraught by numerous 
challenges, a regulation at a lower level was developed in the form of BITs. Bilateral 
agreements were a more manageable platform to negotiate for protection of investments. 
It is important to reflect on the purpose of the creation of BITs. This leads into an interesting 
and insightful discussion filled with many perspectives and parallels. The discussion will be 
structured as follows.  First, a discussion is led on reconciling differences between 
                                                          
140 Caliskan Y The Development of International Investment Law: Lessons from the OECD MAI Negotiations and 
Their Application to a Possible Multilateral Agreement on Investment (2008) 110. 
141 Caliskan Y (2008) 110. 
142 Newcomb AP & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (2009) 55. 
143 Tielaman K ‘The Failure of Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Absence of a Global Public Policy 
Network’ UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.627.7992&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed 28 August 
2017) 9. 
144 Tielaman K ‘The Failure of Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Absence of a Global Public Policy 
Network’ UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.627.7992&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed 28 August 
2017) 9. 
145 Caliskan Y (2008) 111. 
146 There are fundamental differences in the two ideologies with regard to property ownership and rights. 
Thus, it was inevitable that states had different views on protection standards. 
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developed and developing countries. Thereafter, the need to reduce political risk is 
considered as well as the purpose of BITs to restate principles of international law. 
 
2.3.1 Reconciling the ‘seemingly irreconcilable’ differences between developed and developing 
countries 
 
Having unpacked the history of international investment regulation, it is evident that one of 
the problems in international investment law was reaching consensus on standards of 
treatment. The developed countries had certain standards of treatment that they asserted 
to be the correct standing at international law,147 while developing countries insisted they 
were sovereign states who could do as they please with investments in their territory.148 
However, the interdependence of states for globalisation149 saw countries move towards 
reconciling their differences in opinion over treatment of investors. Dolzer and Stevens 
assert that economic cooperation is one of the rationales behind having BITs.150 Developing 
countries saw the need to have investments within their territories as a means to stimulate 
their economies.151 To this, some discussion and position had to be taken by capital-
                                                          
147 International minimum standards that were asserted since the 19th century when investment protection 
was a contentious issue. These include compensation for expropriation as per Hull Rule, and international 
minimum standard of treatment as opposed to national treatment asserted by the Latin American group 
through the Calvo Doctrine. Lipson C (1985) 75. 
148 Subedi SP (2008) 18, Sornarajah (2010) 124-128. 
149 Economic interdependence of states through trade and investment, among other things, has been 
attributed by the need of factors of production that may be attained after crossing borders and moving 
production plants. See the discussion by Paehlke R ‘Globalisation, Interdependence and Sustainability’ in Bell 
DVJ & Cheung YA (eds) Introduction to Sustainable Development (2004). The discussion of economic 
interdependence is an ongoing one. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, speaks to flexibility 
of economies, identifying much needed reforms and ‘ease bottlenecks’ to ensure economic growth and 
benefit from globalisation. See speech by Anne O. Krueger, Former First Deputy Managing Director, IMF 13 
June 2006 available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/061306a.htm (accessed 25 April 2017). 
Further to this, there has been a school of thought that globalisation cannot be resisted, neither can national 
boarder stop the flow of information. Thus, globalisation creates interdependence of economies and therefore 
important to have consensus over issues like investment regulation. See Göksel NK ‘Globalisation and the 
State’ 2004 available at http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/1.-NiluferKaracasuluGoksel.pdf  
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
150 Dolzer R & Stevens M (1995) 12. 
151 This was further supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s Washington consensus 
which encouraged entering into BITs with capital-exporting countries for the purposes of fully realising the 
benefits of foreign investment. See Langalanga A ‘Imagining South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulatory 
Regime in a Global Context’ 2015 South African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper 214 available 
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importing governments on treatment of investors. Essentially, to incentivise FDI, capital-
importing countries had to realise not only their need for investments, but also the 
importance of guaranteeing protection thereafter. Arguably, reconciling the two positions 
on treatment of foreign investors was in part aided by the abandonment of communism by 
most developing states.152 Such abandonment saw the move towards capitalist economy, 
and subsequently, the notion of respect for private property rights. This meant that 
potential host states could see through the prism of capital-exporting states on the rationale 
of protecting private property rights.  
 
2.3.2 Catalysing investment by reducing political risk 
 
For capital movements to be encouraged there was a need to reduce political risk against 
that capital, especially against the history of the 19th century and 20th century capital 
interferences. Efforts to reduce political risks can be seen by the nature of BITs, which 
compel states to trade part of their sovereignty for credibility over hosting foreign capital.153 
BITs create internationally binding obligations on treatment of investors by setting out rules 
on how investors from state parties are to be treated.154 Such binding obligations are 
important to guard against ‘dynamic inconsistency’.155 Thus, one of the purposes of BITs is 
to reduce political risks that would otherwise work to the detriment of investors.156 
Granting protection, stabilising and otherwise limiting a host state government’s regulatory 
freedom is a focal point of BITs.157 This is an important trait as it reduces government 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
at  https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/848-imagining-south-africa-s-foreign-investment-regulatory-
regime-in-a-global-context/file (accessed 25 April 2017) 8.  
152 Langalanga A (2015) 8. However, abandonment of communism did not necessarily aid in increasing FDI 
even after reform of regulation in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. This was in part due to political, economic and 
social problems. See Chan S Foreign Direct Investment in the Changing Global Political Economy (2016) 146.   
153 Aaken V ‘International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis’ 
(2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 507. 
154  Sornarajah (2010) 175. 
155 Schill SW, Tams CJ & Hoffman R International Investment Law and Development: Bridging the Gap (2015) 
157.  
156 Ginsburg T ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Governance’ (2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 117.  
157 Martinez-Fraga P J & Reetz C R Public Purpose in International Law: Rethinking Regulatory Sovereignty in the 
Global Era (2015) 42. 
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intervention which may tend to be arbitrary and intrusive to private property rights.158 To 
further the above, other schools of thought view BITs as a confidence booster for 
investors.159 Moreover, non-commercial safeguards and guarantees provided by BITs 
incentivise investments.160 
Finally, the aim of BITs is to establish enforceable rules for the protection of foreign 
investment from unfair treatment especially expropriation in each contracting country.161 
For an example, BITs identify the circumstances when expropriation of foreign investment 
can take place and compensation to be paid.162 Moreover, BITs establish an investment 
dispute settlement mechanism to enable an investor to claim against breach of treaty 
obligations.163 Therefore, at their core, BITs seek to protect property rights.164 
 
2.3.3 Restating principles of international law 
 
The characteristics of BITs in general are that they lay down international law on treatment 
and protection of investors.165 The bulk of these standards have been positions initially 
taken by capital-exporting states in the 19th and 20th centuries thus, BITs were proposed as 
a means of strengthening principles of customary international law and practice by United 
States and other capital-exporting countries.166  
                                                          
158 See Perera AR ‘The Role and Implications of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050718.2000.9986567 (accessed 25 April 2017) 
159 Sauvant KP & Sachs LE ‘BITs, DTTs, and FDI flows: An Overview’ in Sauvant KP & Sachs LE The Effect of 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment 
Flows (2009) 9.  
160 Subedi SP (2008) 8. 
161 Mina W ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Encourage FDI in the GCC Countries?’ (2010) 2 African Review of 
Economics and Finance 1. See also Shreuer C ‘Investments, International Protection’ available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/investments_Int_Protection.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 2. 
162 Mina W (2015) 1 
163Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEDC) Investment Division ‘Dispute settlement 
provisions in international investment agreements: A large sample survey’ 2012 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 
8.  
164 Sprenger H & Boersma B ‘The Importance of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) When Investing in 
Emerging Markets’ American Bar Business Law Today March 2014 available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/03/01_sprenger.html (accessed 23 April 2017). 
165 See Muchilinski PT (2007) 674-698.  
166 Gudgeon SK ‘United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their Origin, Purposes, and General 
Treatment Standards’ (1986) 4 International Tax and Business Lawyer 111. 
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While restating principles of international law, BITs presented an opportunity to increase 
protection for foreign investors. Guzman asserts that while investors enjoyed protection 
standards prior to BITs, the rush to get foreign investments by capital-importing countries 
meant they competed against each other and subsequently did not foresee that the BITs 
they were signing offered much higher protection overall.167 This was especially surprising 
considering the collective rejection of the Hull Rule in favour of a more lenient standard, yet 
BITs offer investors a much higher standard than that which was offered under customary 
international law.168 
 
2.4 PROBLEMS WITH BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties reinforce standards of treatment through a dispute resolution 
mechanism. In this regard, BITs have been a success in safeguarding the rights and interests 
of investors.169  As a result, BITs have become the most widely used IIA to-date.170  These 
standards in BITs were, however, never intended to be a charter of the economic rights and 
duties of the firms.171 As such, several problems are inherent in BITs, which have been 
discussed by different scholars, and will be briefly unpacked in this section. A more detailed 
discussion of the problems will be given in Chapter 3. Within this generality, focus will be 
placed on discussions led with regard to the rights and obligations of investors and state 
parties which are eye-wateringly unbalanced.  
First generation BITs are hamstrung by the problem that they are constructed with loose 
language, poor drafting and inherently short texts.172 One may examine first generation 
BITs, whose content is usually confined between eight and twelve pages. As such, countries 
like Canada, India and US for example, have revisited policies on investment treaties in an 
                                                          
167 Guzman AT ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment 
treaties’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 643.  
168 Guzman AT (1998) 643. See also Salacuse JW & Sullivan NP ‘Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 68.  
169 Gazzini T ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties’ in Gazzini & De Brabandere E (eds.) International Investment Law: 
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170 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016 101. 
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effort to clarify loose language on concepts such as expropriation and fair and equitable 
treatment.173 When arbitral tribunals are faced with investor claims, they refer to these 
short and unclear BIT texts. Arbitrators themselves have to find meaning of most of the 
language in the texts to which some have been expansionists174 in interpretation and, 
awarding damages host state governments can little afford.175 
Apart from loose language and short texts, BITs have the effect of restricting host 
governments from taking legislative or regulatory measures which would benefit domestic 
firms or give preferential treatment to disadvantaged persons.176 South Africa for example, 
has been sued for pursuing its Constitutional imperatives of economic empowerment.177 In 
exercise of its regulatory powers and under the direction of the Constitution, the 
government of South Africa codified economic empowerment in the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRD).178 Such preferential treatment could run counter to 
national treatment provision in BITs.179 The consequence of this is investors trigger the ISDS 
                                                          
173 Van Harten (2010) 22. Furthermore, one can note how the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the European Union for example, has qualified the fair and equitable treatment in 
its investment chapter. Arguably, this is to guard against uncertainties of loose language in international 
investment agreements. See Article 8.10 of CETA available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017). 
174 UNCTAD 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements' 
2012 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf  (accessed 14 May 2017) 11. See also 
Sornarajah M (2010) 352-354. 
175 Gaukrodger D & Gordon K ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for The Investment Policy 
Community’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment March 2012 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 7. Insensitive 
because some of the claims will attract awards that may affect a county’s fiscal position as noted by. See also 
Rosert D ‘The Stakes Are High: A Review of Financial Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ International 
Institute for Sustainable Development July 2014 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/stakes-are-high-review-financial-costs-investment-treaty-
arbitration.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 15.  
176 Peterson LE ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties – Implications for Sustainable Development and Options for 
Regulation’ 2007 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference Report available at http://www.fes-
globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 
3. 
177 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01. 
Although the claimants later withdrew their case and parties settled, the fact remains governments can be 
sued for legislative or regulatory measures that can diminish or affect an investment. In Metalclad Corporation 
v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, the investors successfully challenged 
government’s right to regulate when they were refused to expand a waste site to an ecological protected 
zone. 
178 MPRD Act No. 49 of 2009, amendment under section 70.   
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Regulation’ 2007 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference Report available at http://www.fes-
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clause, and lead matters of important public policy to be solved before an insensitive 
international arbitral tribunal who are geared to determine breach of investment treaty 
measures.180 Thus, the host state is in a position where it has to have high regard of BIT 
provisions while, in some instances, running counter to its Constitution and other domestic 
laws.181 
Another central challenge to BITs is that claims have been brought forward for indirect 
expropriations using BIT provisions.182 Indirect expropriation has been defined as measures 
by government that gradually encroach upon foreign investment so as to confiscate or 
destroy.183 Although some BITs have a provision for indirect expropriation,184 the texts are 
short and offer no detailed explanation.185 The provisions do not address the distinction 
between compensable and non-compensable regulatory actions.186 Thus, a host 
government can regulate only to the extent that it does not interfere with investments. In 
the event that it does regulate and interfere with an investment, it has to compensate. 
It is also noteworthy to point out that BITs fail in offering clarity for standards of treatment, 
namely fair and equitable treatment (FET). The FET is not clear as to what it means, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
treatment to domestic investors under section 8 (4). This qualifies the national treatment provision, a trait 
short in BITs. 
180 Peterson LE ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties – Implications for Sustainable Development and Options for 
Regulation’ 2007 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference Report available at http://www.fes-
globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 
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181 For an example, South Africa has questioned BITs against its Constitution, and saw disconnect between the 
country’s domestic imperatives and the commitment in its BITs. See Langalanga A (2015) 8-9. See also South 
African Institute of International Affairs ‘Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 2013’ Submission to the 
Department of Trade and Industry 1 November 2017 available at https://www.saiia.org.za/general-
publications/799-saiia-submission-investment-protection-and-promotion-bill/file (accessed 25 April 2017).   
182  For example, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8. 
183 Peterson LE ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties – Implications for Sustainable Development and Options for 
Regulation’ 2007 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference Report available at http://www.fes-
globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 
3. See also Isakoff PD ‘Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International Investments’ (2013) 3 
Global Business Law Review 192-194. 
184 Germany–Poland BIT, 1989, Article 4.2; Australia–Vietnam BIT, 1991, Article 7.1; Guinea–Egypt BIT, 1998, 
Article 5.1; Cameroon– Mali BIT, 2001, Article 6.1; Israel–Estonia BIT, 1994, Article 5.1 
185. Peterson LE ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties – Implications for Sustainable Development and Options for 
Regulation’ 2007 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference Report available at http://www.fes-
globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017) 
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inconsistent arbitral awards add more confusion and uncertainty.187 The standard has been 
termed by some scholars as vague.188 As such, case law points to different interpretations. 
For example, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada189 states that an investor is entitled to 
international law minimum standard of treatment, plus fairness elements;190 while in the 
TecMed case,191 the tribunal held that FET requires the state parties to provide treatment 
that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign 
investor to make the investment.192 In TecMed, the Tribunal further held that consistency in 
the acts of the host state is an expectation by the investor.193 These decisions are different 
and inconsistent, and may delegitimise the investor – state dispute settlement 
mechanism.194 
The full protection and security (FSP) clause is not clear whether it refers to physical 
protection or could extend to other kinds of protection. Scholars like Schreuer assert that it 
is beyond doubt that the FSP standard relates to physical protection of the investor and 
their assets.195 Tribunals in Rumeli196 and Saluka197 have also reinforced the notion that FSP 
is limited to physical protection. In Saluka, the Tribunal said the FSP standard applies when 
the foreign investment has been affected by civil strife and physical violence, and is not 
meant to cover any other impairment of an investor’s investment.198 In contrast, the 
Tribunal in Azurix v Argentina held that breach of the FSP standard can still be established 
even in instances where there is no physical violence.199 Such inconsistencies are 
problematic in investment treaty practice. 
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196 Rumeli v Kazakhstan Award 29 July 2008 para 668.  
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Another clause that is problematic in investment treaty practice is the most-favoured nation 
(MFN). In theory, it is intended to guard against discrimination;200 however, practice has 
seen it giving room for countries to sue under a BIT they are not necessarily a party to.201 In 
the White Industries Case202 a provision of assisting an investor with effective means for 
enforcement of rights was absent in the India-Australia BIT but however present in the 
Kuwait-India BIT. To this, the tribunal found no difficulty to use the MFN provision to find in 
India in breach of its obligation to provide an effective means to enforce rights. 203 This 
therefore, shows how treaty provisions can be abused.204 Investors have the opportunity to 
rely on provisions negotiated in the past or future treaties.205 
Finally, the national treatment clause in BITs is problematic regardless of its popularity. 
Many BITs focus on providing a general provision on national treatment, which only speaks 
to equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors.206 The challenge with this provision is 
that it does not account for domestic needs of host states.207 For instance, such a provision 
does not allow a host state to afford its nationals preferential treatment in line with its 
national objectives and development agenda.208 
In light of the above, it is imperative to realise the need to revisit BITs that they reflect on 
what state parties actually intend to do. For example, if states commit themselves to not 
treat investments inequitably, it should not be interpreted to mean what the parties 
                                                          
200 Collins D An Introduction to International Investment Law (2016) 110. 
201 As in the case of White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award (30 
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intended as opposed to expansive interpretation.  Furthermore, the BIT texts themselves 
should expressly provide direction on interpretation by expanding the language and 
provisions that are short and open to interpretation. National treatment provisions should 
be qualified, giving exceptions to the rule. Apart from addressing problems with the current 
content of BITs, the texts should be conscious of host state needs by allowing for regulatory 
space and distinguishing between compensable and no compensable regulatory measures.   
 
2.5 PROPOSITION TO BALANCE INTERESTS OF INVESTORS AND HOST STATE PARTIES IN 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
In view of the above, there have been proposal to balance the interests of parties to a BIT, 
especially with the view that first generation BITs are unbalanced. There are different 
scholars asserting a balance in the structure of BITs. Notwithstanding that scholarly debate, 
state practice has reflected a backlash against the structure of BITs209 by revisiting the texts 
and putting forward model treaties or terminating BITs altogether.  
Continuance of traditional treaty practice is subjecting developing countries to the risk of 
being sued,210 attracting penalties which are exorbitant. Moreover, these traditional or first 
generation BITs typically remain in force for more than ten years and additional years owing 
to sunset clauses that most carry.211 Negotiation of new, more balanced IIAs is an important 
and necessary step.212 Although it is an important step to negotiate, Berger opines it is not 
sufficient as developing countries need to find ways to reduce liability resulting from old, 
less balanced BITs that remain in force especially under the sunset clauses.213 There have 
been suggestions to issue interpretive notes in IIAs, to hedge against unfavourable terms in 
the first generation BITs.214 Berger opines that policy makers in developing countries should 
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get the content of IIAs right by drafting treaty templates taking into account international 
experiences with investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses.215 Once there is an 
appropriate treaty template, there is need to decide on the context in which to 
renegotiate.216 
The United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) heralds new 
generation investment policy, with an aim to broaden the regulatory space of host states.217 
This is because BITs limit regulatory space for host states by constraining measures 
pertaining to host state’s regulatory prerogative which may take the form of 
protectionism.218 Therefore, tension between interests and expectations of capital exporting 
states and capital importing states has been a recurring point of departure; as such, a key 
investment policy challenge is identifying the need to adjust the balance between rights and 
obligations of host states and investors.219  
A view has also been echoed that BITs should give effect to development objectives in 
pursuit of a balanced structure.220 The Energy Charter and North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) for example, commit themselves to sustainable development, labour 
and environmental concerns, by citing them as objectives in the preamble.221 Derogating 
from or relaxing of domestic measures for health, safety and environment would be 
inappropriate.222 Furthermore, the fact that a controversial issue like labour protection can 
be dealt with amongst three countries at different levels of development and diverse labour 
legislation,223 can serve as an example of how a balance in treaty law substance can be 
achieved through negotiation and compromise.  
Schill and Jacob assert the view that investment treaty-making could be refined, striking a 
clearer and more appropriate balance between investor protection and non-investment 
                                                          
215 Berger (2015) 25. 
216 Berger (2015) 25. 
217 UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development available at 
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related public policy.224 Such an example would be the India Model BIT, which is part of the 
third generation BITs. There has been refinement by USA, Norway and South Africa of model 
BITs as well as renegotiation of existing treaties.225 This reaction shows discontentment with 
existing IIAs and the lack of balance they strike between the host country’s right to regulate 
and the expectations of investors regarding transparent, predictable and consistent 
investment framework.226 The dissatisfaction with IIAs was also attributed to interpretation 
by arbitral tribunals, triggering refinement and a call for balancing the rights, obligations and 
public interest.227 The need for balance in IIAs is seeking modification from older, dubbed 
first generation BITs, to more modern approaches to investment treaty making.228 Schill and 
Jacob, however, challenge an assumption that there is a uniform and general development 
in investment treaty practice from traditional short and unrefined BITs to more elaborate 
well-intended models.229  
It is noteworthy that both developed and developing countries are revisiting their BITs and 
seeking a better balance between rights and obligations of investors and state parties.230 In 
the 1990s for an example, Canada, Mexico and the US were in pursuit of reform in the 
international investment regime and policy after an awakening of the powers allocated to 
investors.231 Moreover, states have revisited their BITs for the purpose of clarity on 
language to ensure uniformity and coherence in treaty interpretation.232 
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2.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The chapter has seen that BITs come as a saving grace after there were failures to regulate 
international investment multilaterally or by traditional FCN treaties. BITs reconciled divides 
in opinion and reinforced standards of international law. The contents of BITs reflect on 
their purpose, which is to guarantee protection of investors and investments and in that 
regard, they have been successful.  However, the contents regard the interests of the 
investor at the expense of the host country. The chapter highlighted challenges with BITs. 
Some of the most notable and notorious provisions include FET, NT, FPS, MFN and other 
types of expropriation such as indirect expropriation. 
Furthermore, BITs have become outmoded being overtaken by events in developing host 
states that are now undergoing reforms in their economies in pursuit of different 
development agendas. This presents an opportunity to revisit BITs and modify them in line 
with new trends and thoughts. Resolving the shortcomings of BITs essentially entails 
balancing rights and obligations of state parties and investors.  Countries like the US, Canada 
and India have revisited their Model BITs, for more consolidated models.  The problematic 
provisions identified above will further be discussed in the following chapter in an analysis 
of Zimbabwe's BITs. Against this background, the next chapter critically analyses 
Zimbabwe’s BITs with a view of unearthing the inherent challenges in these documents. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF ZIMBABWE’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses Zimbabwe’s BITs which are currently in force. The central discussion in 
this chapter will be on the problematic structure of Zimbabwe BITs and treaty provisions in 
these texts. Arguments are made to the effect that most of these provisions are drafted 
loosely and open the floodgates of interpretation. The structure of this chapter is as follows. 
First, a brief background to Zimbabwe’s BITs is provided. Secondly, an analysis of BIT 
structure overall and then analysis of selected provisions is undertaken.233  
 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Zimbabwe is a party to 54 BITs, 9 of which are in force.234 This chapter will however examine 
5 BITs currently in force, whose text is available to the public.235 When analysing 
Zimbabwe’s BITs, it is important to note that these texts were signed and entered into force 
at different times. The China- Zimbabwe BIT was signed in May 1996 and entered into force 
1 March 1998.236 Two months later, the Netherlands- Zimbabwe BIT entered into force.237 In 
                                                          
233 In this Chapter, not all problematic provisions will be discussed. See part 1.7 of this thesis. 
234 Sibanda G ‘Zimbabwe: Government signs 54 trade pacts’ The Herald 22 June 2015 available at 
http://www.bilaterals.org/?zimbabwe-govt-signs-54-trade-pacts (accessed 26 April 2017). Other sources 
however, point to 35 signed BITs and 10 in force, see UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub: Zimbabwe’s Bilateral 
Investment Treaties available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/233#iiaInnerMenu  
(accessed 26 April 2017).  
235 Although it is reported to be 10 BITs in force, 5 will be used in this chapter because the other 5 are 
unavailable. Two BITs, namely Russia – Zimbabwe BIT and Denmark- Zimbabwe BIT, are in Russian and Danish 
respectively. There are no English texts available. Furthermore, while Kuwait – Zimbabwe BIT, Serbia- 
Zimbabwe BIT and Iran – Zimbabwe BIT are in force, there are no texts accessible online. Thus, this chapter will 
examine at Zimbabwe’s BITs with China, Germany, Netherlands, South Africa and Switzerland.  
236 UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub: Zimbabwe’s Bilateral Investment Treaties available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/233#iiaInnerMenu  (accessed 26 April 2017). 
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the second quarter of 2000, the Germany- Zimbabwe BIT entered into force, although it was 
signed in 1995.238 A year later from the entry into force of the Germany – Zimbabwe BIT, the 
Switzerland-Zimbabwe BIT, negotiated in 1996, entered into force.239 Finally, the South 
Africa – Zimbabwe BIT entered into force on 15 September 2010, a year after its signing. To 
sum up the timeline, of the 5 available in-force BITs, 4 were negotiated and signed in the 
1990s, while one was negotiated in 2009.  
Although these BITs were negotiated and signed in different millenniums, they are 
inherently the same in structure and content, with minor differences. This shows an 
interesting pattern in the investment treaty signing of Zimbabwe. Arguably, there is an 
indifferent attitude to the effects of these texts and their implications especially against the 
discussion of balancing interests of investors and state parties. This argument uncloaks 
some of the challenges abound in these BITs.  It is against this background the next section 
discusses the structure of Zimbabwe’s BITs and some of the problems inherent in them.  
 
3.3 STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
Since the inception of BITs, they have undergone minor developments. It is therefore not 
shocking that these BITs would have significant challenges. One of these challenges pertains 
to the structure of BITs.  To begin, BITs expressly provides for standards of treatment, 
however, these are often articulated in one paragraph without explanation. For instance, 
the Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT reads: 
‘Investment and returns of investors shall at all times be accorded with fair and equitable 
treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
237 UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub: Zimbabwe’s Bilateral Investment Treaties available at 
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http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/233#iiaInnerMenu  (accessed 26 April 2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
36 
 
discriminatory measures to the management, maintenance, use enjoyment, extension or 
disposal of investments in its territory of investors of the other contracting party.’240 
Another example noteworthy is that found in the Netherlands – Zimbabwe BIT, which reads: 
‘(1) Each contracting party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment of the investments of 
nationals of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures, the operation management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal thereof by those nationals. Each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments 
full physical security and protection.’241 
There are two distinct standards of treatment provided for in the two provisions highlighted 
above, namely fair and equitable treatment and full security and protection standard. 
Failure to provide for these standards has the ability to impair investments, however they 
remain distinct standards which must still be explained and qualified separately. 
Apart from the FET and FPS standard, the BIT texts of Zimbabwe seemingly provide for 
another standard that obliges state parties not to impair investments by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures to either the maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of the 
investment. The text is not clear whether or not this obligation gives meaning to the FET and 
FPS or is a standalone standard. Arguably, had the standard intended to give meaning to the 
often vague and notorious FET, the text could have expressly said so.   
In addition to the above, the structure of BITs is focused on protecting investors and thus 
give rights generously and on a wider array as compared to customary international law.242 
Investor rights are given through different standards of treatment and are inviolable, 
justiciable and inalienable.243 While there are reasons of doing so, it has then created a 
system that is investor interest oriented.244 Such a system has thus, ignored host state 
legitimate interests. Notably, the state has no rights in first generation BITs. The host state 
                                                          
240 Article 4 para 1 of Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT. The text has been bolded as part of my own emphasis. 
241 Article 3 (1) of Netherlands – Zimbabwe BIT. The text has been bolded as part of my own emphasis.  
242 Elkins Z, Guzman AT & Simmons BA ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
1960 – 2000’ (2006) 60 International Organisation 814. 
243 Franck SD ‘The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment 
Treaties Have a Bright Future’ (2005) 12 University of California International Law and Policy 52-55. 
244 Davarnejad L ‘Strengthening the Social Dimension of International Investment Agreements by Integrating 
Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises’ OECD Global Forum on International Investment March 2008 
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would be ordinarily interested in the right to regulate,245 a critical feature of sovereignty.246 
Such a right, in the perspective of the state, would usher in practical socio-economic and 
environment issues that investments have an impact on. Thus, the BIT regime would be 
more balanced. 
Bilateral investment treaties are shy of human rights obligations. Investment treaties must 
include explicit human rights provisions in order to protect the ability of the state to take 
appropriate measures under international or domestic human rights obligations.247 The 
absence of human rights clauses within BITs results in interpretation that permits actions 
that violate human rights.248 When BITs incorporate human rights obligations, it aids in the 
interpretation of the treaty by arbitral tribunals, fully realising a state’s obligations of those 
rights to its people.249  
An analysis of the Foresti Case for example, indicates that human rights organisations were 
granted permission to assist the Tribunal in interpreting the South African Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 in light of the country’s constitutional 
and human rights obligations.250 Human rights activists were concerned that the claimant’s 
interpretation of South Africa’s BITs could severely impinge on government’s policymaking 
space and impede its ability to pursue key policies such as economic empowerment.251 
Thus, a strict interpretation of treaty provisions may give an inappropriate outcome that 
trumps on human rights. It is therefore essential that human rights provisions are 
articulated in BITs as these clauses lead to the necessity of addressing issues of importance 
to host states.252 
                                                          
245 See generally Mann H 'The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law' November 2002 
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_right_to_regulate.pdf  (accessed 6 May 2017). 
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There are other examples where issues of importance to host states are accentuated by 
legislative and administrative measures, but however challenged by foreign investors under 
the protection of BITs and these cases have grown in number.253 In November 2011, Philip 
Morris filed an investment treaty claim against Australia and its passing of the Tobacco Plain 
Packaging Act.254 Philip Morris sought suspension of the legislation’s enforcement or 
compensatory damages.255 Australia’s regulatory measure forbade the use of graphics, 
symbols or images in their packaging and marketing with the aim of reducing the appeal of 
tobacco products especially because of growing concern of public health.256 Similarly, 
Germany was dragged to arbitration by a Swedish Energy Company, Vattenfall,257 after it 
had initiated a phase-out of nuclear power.258 Vattenfall argued that the impact of new 
German environmental regulations are in violation of Germany’s commitments as a 
signatory to the energy charter treaty.259 The dispute was later settled, with Germany 
agreeing to a watered down environmental permit in favour of the corporation.260 
In addition to the above, the structure of first generation BITs is not reflective of some 
constitutional requirements and directions. Zimbabwe’s neighbour and fellow SADC 
member state South Africa, has reviewed and terminated its BITs. This is, in part, owed to 
the inhibiting stance these texts pose against the country’s transformative constitution.261 
The economic empowerment laws of South Africa, are aimed at redressing past injustices 
and empower previously marginalised groups within the Republic.262 As a constitutional 
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imperative, government has thus explored and implored ways of achieving that. However, 
this has been problematic to investors and they have challenged economic empowerment 
laws.263 As such, it is noteworthy that BITs give ample room for commercial interests of 
investors to be fulfilled, while issues of public interest are side-lined.264 To this, one then 
contemplates the bulk of Zimbabwe’s BITs that do not to give light to new government 
policy and particularly Constitutional directives. The new transformative Constitution of 
Zimbabwe speaks to economic empowerment.265 Government is encouraged to aspire to 
economic empowerment and have done so in numerous ways. One of such ways is by 
preferential treatment provided for nationals under the Procurement Act of Zimbabwe. This 
is not given as an exception to the national treatment standard in most of Zimbabwe’s BITs. 
The potential effect of this is that in cases where such preferential treatment is given to 
domestic firms, Zimbabwe as a host state runs risk of violating its national treatment 
obligation under BITs. 
 
3.4 PROBLEMATIC TREATY PROVISIONS IN ZIMBABWE’S BITS  
 
3.4.1 National Treatment Clause266 
 
 The national treatment clause is a common provision in BITs which appears in most texts 
Zimbabwe is a party to. The provision places an obligation on the host state to treat foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See also The Department of Trade ‘South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment’ June 2003 available at https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee-
strategy.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017) 8. 
263 An example is the case Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa 2009 ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/07/01, where the Italian nationals challenged Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
No. 28 of 2002  which was part and parcel of economic empowerment policy and law in South Africa.  
264 Hindelang S & Krajewski M (eds.) Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More Balanced, Less 
Isolated, Increasingly Diversified (2016). See also  Executive Summary of Government Position Paper ‘Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review’ The Department of Trade & Industry 2009 available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/32386_961.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017) 11.  
265 Section 14 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Further to this, the Procurement Act of Zimbabwe speaks to 
affirmative action through preferential treatment given to companies that have indigenous Zimbabweans as 
majority shareholders. 
266 Article 3.2 Netherlands – Zimbabwe BIT, article 3.2 and 3.3 South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT, and article 4.2 and 
4.3 Switzerland - Zimbabwe BIT. 
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and domestic investors and their investments equally.267 Ordinarily, the national treatment 
standard involves an analysis of two issues.268 First, the definition of the standard itself, and 
secondly, the factual situation in which the standard applies.269 A factual situation is one 
that requires identical circumstances, thus offering narrow scope of application of national 
treatment.270 An example would be the national treatment clause of United Kingdom- Belize 
BIT,271 which is further qualified by requiring the investor to show he/she was treated 
unfairly in the same circumstances. The provision reads: 
‘(1) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns of nationals 
or companies of the other Contracting Parry to treatment less favourable than that which it 
accords in the same circumstances to investments or returns of its own nationals or 
companies or to investments or returns of nationals or companies of any third State’272 
Notwithstanding the popularity of the national treatment provision, some BITs do not 
expressly provide for it with the purpose of avoiding giving preferential treatment that is 
otherwise meant to benefit domestic entities.273 For example, China has in the past 
excluded the national treatment clause.274 However, in recent agreements, it has opted to 
include this provision, but however in a qualified manner. Typically, this qualification would 
state that national treatment will be accorded subject to national laws.275  
A qualified national treatment clause limits the liability of the host state to lawsuits that 
may arise after it has given preferential treatment to domestic firms. It indicates to the 
investor that while they expect to be treated equally as with domestic entities, there are 
limitations to that right. The factual situation test is a trait short in Zimbabwe’s BIT. As a 
                                                          
267 Sauvant KP (ed.) ‘International Investment Agreements: Key Issues’ UNCTAD October 2010 available at 
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consequence, it exposes the state to lawsuits which may arise in circumstances that are 
incomparable.  
Commendably, the South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT qualifies the national treatment provision 
and further envisages economic empowerment.276  It reads: 
‘(4) The provisions of sub-Articles (2) and (3) shall not be construed so as to oblige one Party 
to    extend to the investors of the other Party the benefit of any treatment, preference or 
privilege resulting from: 
(c) any domestic law or other measure the purpose of which is to promote the achievement 
of equality in its territory, or designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in its territory.’277 
The structure of the national treatment standard in the South Africa- Zimbabwe BIT is 
largely due to the fact that the BIT itself was signed after the both countries had a clear 
standing on their economic empowerment policies and laws.278 Therefore, the BIT reflects 
positions influenced by their respective constitutional imperatives as well as legislative 
reforms. However, other Zimbabwean BITs do not enjoy the same luxuries as they were 
signed in the 1990s, when economic empowerment was not law but merely government 
policy.279 For example, Netherlands – Zimbabwe BIT does not expand the national treatment 
provision by providing for exceptions. It merely reads:  
‘(2) More particularly, each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments treatment 
which in any case shall not be less favourable than that accorded either to investments of its 
own nationals…’280 
It is not unusual for a developing country like Zimbabwe to encourage indigenous 
businesses by offering preferential treatment. In fact, such a position has been noted to be a 
legitimate one for purposes of protecting the development of indigenous industrial 
production and service provision in the face of potentially negative competitive pressure 
                                                          
276 Policies that both countries follow. 
277 Article 3.4 South – Africa Zimbabwe BIT. 
278 These are Black Economic Empowerment laws in South Africa and Indigenisation laws in Zimbabwe.  
279 See Mumbengegwi C Macroeconomic Structural Adjustment Policies in Zimbabwe (2001) 102. 
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from powerful foreign investors.281 In the Zimbabwean context, preferential treatment for 
indigenous businesses is provided through government procurement.  The majority of 
government tenders can only be accessed by companies that have a 51% indigenous 
shareholding. This is envisaged under the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 
section 3(1)(f). The provision provides that government departments, statutory bodies and 
local authorities shall procure at least 51% of their goods and services from businesses in 
which a controlling interest is held by indigenous Zimbabweans. This means that the 
government will consider companies that do not have a 51% ownership quota, however, 
such companies are limited to only 49% of the government tenders.  
While wholly foreign owned entities are limited to 49% of government tenders as provided 
by law, section 3 (1) (g) of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act creates an 
obligation for those wholly foreign owned companies to favour suppliers whose businesses 
have indigenous Zimbabweans holding the controlling interest; that is in the event they are 
to offer goods and services to the government under the Procurement Act.282 The 
preference is therefore in ownership threshold. 
Notwithstanding the above, investors are required to cede 51% of ownership to indigenous 
Zimbabweans pursuant to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act.283 This 
entails that every business should qualify for government procurement as they would have 
ceded 51% ownership to indigenous Zimbabweans. There is however, some companies that 
                                                          
281 Muchilisnki PT, Ortino F & Shcreuer C (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) 
96. 
282 Section 3(1)(g) of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act reads: 
‘(g) where goods and services are procured in terms of the Procurement Act [Chapter 22:14] from  
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are yet to comply with the Act.284 Non-compliance is attributed, in part, to the confusion 
between the Act, regulations and ideas of the President.285  
Arguably, indigenisation on ownership of foreign owned companies should be done away 
with. This is because in the SADC region, Zimbabwe is the only country to implement 
indigenisation thresholds where controlling interests are given up.286 Given the similarity of 
the investment sectors in SADC economies, investors would use other countries as safe 
havens for their investments.287 Thus, it would then become necessary to qualify the 
national treatment clause in Zimbabwe’s so as to close potential avenues for non-
compliance with the national treatment clause. 
 
3.4.2 Most Favoured Nation Treatment288  
 
Another common provision in BITs is the most-favoured nation treatment (MFN) standard. 
It provides that investors from state parties shall not receive treatment less favourable than 
that awarded to investors from third states.289 The provision is a non-discriminatory 
measure that seeks to guard against economic distortions that could occur through country 
                                                          
284 See Kuwaza K ‘Indigenisation process gets murkier’ The Independent 24 March 2016 available at 
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/24/indigenisation-process-gets-murkier/ (accessed 22 May 
2017). This year Edgar’s, a clothing company, has complied with the indigenisation laws. It is apparent that 
there is a snail pace these companies have on complying with indigenisation laws in Zimbabwe. See Kazunga O 
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285 See generally Matyszak D ‘Chaos Clarified – Zimbabwe’s “New” Indigenisation Framework’ Research and 
Advocacy Unit 2016 available at http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Chaos%20Clarified.pdf 
(accessed 20 May 2017). 
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287 Kondo T ‘Investment Law in a Globalised Environment: A Proposal for a New Investment Regime in 
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Investment February 2004 available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/wp-2004_2.pdf   
(accessed 28 April 2017) 2.  
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by country liberalisation.290 Therefore, the MFN clause has become a significant instrument 
of economic liberalisation.291 
Initially, the MFN clause was aimed at ensuring traders were not discriminated against in 
particular markets.292 Today however, the standard has been problematic as investors have 
used the clause to ‘import’ a more favourable clause in other BITs the host state is a party 
to.293 There is a school of thought that asserts that it is inaccurate to describe MFN clauses 
of this time as reflecting an attempt by states to eliminate market discrimination.294 Rather, 
Cole gives a brief synopsis of the history of the MFN clause in trade law295 and concludes 
that: 
‘MFN clauses have simply never been the generalized non-discrimination provisions that 
some contemporary commentators have portrayed them as being. They were originally 
developed as a means of gaining specific advantages already offered to specific third states, 
and, even when the generalized form of MFN treatment became dominant, the clause was 
used tactically as a means of ensuring market benefits rather than as a principled means of 
promoting multilateral non-discrimination.’296 
Moreover, investors can latch on to more favourable treatment provided in past or present 
treaties.297 It is therefore, against this background that one will see the problems with the 
MFN treatment today. In BITs, clause importing has been enabled by the MFN standard. This 
                                                          
290 Salomon C & Friedrich S ‘How Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties Affect 
Arbitration’ Practical Law Arbitration 2013 available at https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/favoured-nation-
clauses-arbitration (accessed 28 April 2017) 1.  
291 Salomon C & Friedrich S ‘How Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties Affect 
Arbitration’ Practical Law Arbitration 2013 available at https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/favoured-nation-
clauses-arbitration (accessed 28 April 2017) 1. OEDC ‘Most-favoured Nation Treatment in International 
Investment Law’ Working Papers on International Investment February 2004 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/wp-2004_2.pdf   (accessed 28 April 2017) 2. 
292 Cole T ‘Boundaries of Most Favoured National Treatment in International Investment Law’ (2012) 33 
Michigan Journal of International Law 546. 
293 Salomon C & Friedrich S ‘How Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties Affect 
Arbitration’ Practical Law Arbitration 2013 available at https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/favoured-nation-
clauses-arbitration (accessed 28 April 2017) 2-3. 
294 Cole T (2012) 547-552. 
295 Cole T (2012) 553. 
296 Cole T (2012) 553. 
297 Sornarajah M (2010) 204. 
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has been with the assistance of arbitral tribunals, who have created a norm for investors to 
benefit from treaty provisions they are not even a party to.298  
Zimbabwe’s BITs do contain the provision of MFN treatment and could experience the same 
problems the standard brings about. The standard is fairly the same in all of Zimbabwe’s 
BITs with minor differences. For example, the standard in South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT 
reads: 
‘(1) Investments and returns that are reinvested of investors of either Party shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection in the territory of 
the other Party. Neither Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its 
territory of investors of the other Party. 
(2) Each Party shall in its territory accord to investments and returns of investors of the 
other Party treatment not less favourable than that which it accords to investments and 
returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of investors of any third State. 
(3) Each Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other Party treatment not less 
favourable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third 
State.’299 
 
Notwithstanding this, the article further gives exceptions to the general rule and application 
of the MFN standard. It reads:  
‘(4) The provisions of sub-Articles (2) and (3) shall not be construed so as to oblige one Party 
to extend to the investors of the other Party the benefit of any treatment, preference or 
privilege resulting from – 
 
(a) any existing or future customs union, free trade area, common market, any 
similar international agreement or any interim arrangement leading up to such 
                                                          
298 This is evident in the number of cases decided on by ISDS arbitration tribunals, such as those in CME Czech 
Republic BV v Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, Award, 14 March 2003), Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil 
Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008) and MTD v Chile 
(ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004). See also Cole T (2012) 560. 
299 Article 3 of South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT.  
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customs union, free trade area, or common market to which either Party is or may 
become a party; or 
 
(b) any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to 
taxation or any domestic legislation relating wholly or mainly to taxation; or 
 
(c) … 
 
(5) If a Party accords special advantages to development finance institutions with  foreign 
participation and established for the exclusive purpose of development assistance through 
mainly non-profit activities, that Party shall not be obliged to accord such advantages to 
development finance institutions or other investors of the other Party.’300 
 
 
This approach is similar in all of Zimbabwe’s BITs. However, the problem lies in the 
limitation of the scope of application of the MFN clause. It remains questionable as to how 
far the clause extends and/or how far it ought to extend to for it to take a balanced position 
in the regulation of an investment.  
One may analyse the case of Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon 
Hizmetleri AS v Kazakhstan301 where the claimants used the MFN clause in the  Turkey- 
Kazakhstan BIT to import a variety of substantive protections from other Kazakh BITs, 
including the obligation to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of the investments of 
investors of the other Contracting Party; the duty not to deny justice; the obligation to 
accord full protection and security to such investments; and the obligation not to impair by 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment, or disposal of such investments.302 Essentially, investors are enabled to bypass 
provisions of the applicable BIT.303 By allowing this, state parties are bound to extend 
                                                          
300 Article 3.4 (a) – (b) and 3.5 of South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT. 
301 Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No ARB/05/16, 
Award, 29 July 2008). 
302 Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No ARB/05/16, 
Award, 29 July 2008) para 575. 
303 Bernasconi-Osterwalder N & Johnson L ‘Commentary to the Australian Model Investment Treaty’ November 
2011 available at 
https://media.arbeiterkammer.at/wien/PDF/studien/Studie_Investitionsschutzabkommen_en.pdf (accessed 7 
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treatment which they had not intended to when entering a bilateral investment protection 
agreement.  
The MFN clause is problematic, however notwithstanding this, it remains a cornerstone in 
the protection against discrimination of investors. Sometimes, allocation of rights or 
preferential treatment may be due to a ‘facilitation fee’ or ‘greasing of the wheel’,304 as such 
create an unfair playing field for investors, especially those from countries that are unable 
to do so. Therefore, the MFN treatment serves as a disincentive against such practices. The 
inclusion of an MFN clause in investment treaties remains an interesting unit of further 
research. CETA signatories have limited the scope of application of the MFN clause, 
providing for instances where the MFN clause can and cannot find application.305 
 
3.4.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment306 
 
The most important provision from the perspective of the investor is the fair and equitable 
treatment clause (FET).307 It is a rule of international law and not determined by laws of the 
host state.308 Although this provision is a common clause in BITs, there is no standalone 
definition of the FET standard in BITs.309 In fact, some scholars like Sornarajah310 are of the 
view that FET is an international minimum standard the US has sought to assert for over a 
century and remains uncertain as to what it encompasses as its content.311  
                                                          
304  See for example OECD efforts to guard against these practices through its Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted in 1997 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf  (accessed 1 May 2017). Further to this, 
there have been further efforts to enjoin non-members of OECD to cooperate in combating corruption, 
particularly major exporters and investors. See ‘Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions’ November 2009 available at 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf (accessed 1 May 2017). 
305 Article 8.7 para 1, 3 and 4 of CETA. 
306 Article 3.1 of China – Zimbabwe BIT, article 3.1 Netherlands – Zimbabwe BIT, article 3.1 South Africa – 
Zimbabwe BIT and 4 para 1 of Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT. 
307 Muchilinski PT et al (eds.) (2008) 97. 
308 Schreuer C ‘Investments, International Protection’ January 2011 available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/investments_Int_Protection.pdf (accessed 29 April 2017) 9. 
309 Muchilisnki PT ‘The Framework of Investment Protection: The Content of BITs’ in Sauvant KP & Sachs LE 
(eds.) The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation 
Treaties, and Investment Flows (2009) 46. 
310 Sornarajah M Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment (2015). 
311 Sornarajah M (2015) 246. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
48 
 
 The law on fair and equitable treatment is primarily for the purposes of promoting 
investment protection and not to bring about a law that balances investor interests and host 
state interests.312 This is attributed to the expansionist approach taken by arbitral tribunals 
when interpreting the FET standard.313 It is necessary however to consider the needs of the 
host state to regulate the behaviour of aliens in its territory for public interest.314 Therefore, 
leaving the FET standard without an attempt to describe what it is, leaves the host state 
vulnerable. Drafters of CETA for example, have tried to give meaning to FET by explicitly 
stating that a measure or series of measures that subsequently constitute denial of justice, 
fundamental breach of due process and abusive treatment of investors, among other things, 
could constitute unfair and inequitable treatment.315 
 
In Zimbabwe’s BITs, the  FET clause is articulated without clarity. For example, Switzerland – 
Zimbabwe BIT which reads: 
‘Investments and returns of each contracting party shall at all times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of another 
Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures in the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension or 
disposal of investments in its territory of investors of the other Contracting Party.’316 
When examining the FET provision provided in the Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT, it is unclear 
whether the preceding sentence is meant to give interpretation the FET clause. The 
language lacks specific meaning and is particularly prone to expansive interpretation simply 
because an arbitral tribunal does not have sufficient interpretative guidance from the 
text.317  
                                                          
312 Sornarajah M (2015) 247. 
313 UNCTAD 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements' 
2012 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf  (accessed 14 May 2017) 11. 
314 Muchilinski PT Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2007) 636. 
315 Article 8.10 (2) of Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the 
European Union signed 30 October 2016 available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf (accessed 3 May 2017). 
316 Article 4 para 1 of Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT. Bolded for own emphasis. 
317 UNCTAD 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements' 
2012 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf  (accessed 14 May 2017) 11. 
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Lacking sufficient guidance to interpret the FET clause has resulted in inconsistent 
interpretations. Zimbabwe’s BITs do not expand what the FET standard means and could 
face the same challenge of different and inconsistent decisions. Talbot318 and TecMed319 are 
examples of cases that have diverging interpretations of what the FET standard is. In 
TecMed for example, the Tribunal held that FET requires the state parties to provide 
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment.320 In addition to that, the Tribunal held that 
consistency in the acts of the host state is an expectation by the investor.321  
By relying on the legitimate expectations of the investor as affirmed in TecMed, the result 
may be an unbalanced approach, which unduly favours investor interests and overrides 
legitimate regulation in the public interest.322 Tribunals are encouraged to consider 
treatment of an investor in isolation, without a consideration of overarching determinations 
whether the treatment was justified.323 Legitimate expectation encourages tribunals to 
focus on the extent to which a measure interferes with the interests of the investor rather 
than the extent to which the benefits of a measure exceeds its costs overall.324 
There is a school of thought that attributes diverging interpretations of the FET clause to the 
drafting itself.325 There are different approaches in drafting the FET clause. One has been to 
link FET to international law.326 Another drafting style is to link the standard to minimum 
standard under customary international law.327 Determining what FET stands for has been 
                                                          
318 Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada UNCITRAL final merits award 10 April 2001. 
319 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2. 
320 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States para 154. 
321 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States para 154. 
322 UNCTAD 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements' 
2012 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf  (accessed 14 May 2017) 11. 
323 Sauvant KP (ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (2013) 705. 
324 Sauvant KP (ed.) (2013) 705. 
325 UNCTAD 'Fair And Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements' 
2012 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf  (accessed 15 May 2017). 
326 As that done in the Croatia – Oman BIT under article 3 (2) which reads: ‘Investments or returns of investors 
of either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment in accordance with international law and provisions of this Agreement.’ [Own emphasis added]  
327 This approach has been adopted in the  Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for 
an Economic Partnership (2006), under article 91 which reads ‘Each Party shall accord to investments of 
investors of the other Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment..’ and The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” do not require treatment in addition to or 
beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens’. 
[Own emphasis added]. 
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problematic and controversial such that newer agreements on investment have expressly 
provided what the standard entails. For example, Rwanda – US BIT reads:  
‘1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.  
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection 
and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by 
that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 
to provide: 
(a) "fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, 
or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process 
embodied in the principal legal systems of the world; and’328 
To avoid onerous standards being put upon it, Zimbabwe has to revisit its BITs to give clarity 
to the FET clause. 
 
3.4.4 Full Protection and Security329 
 
Another important provision in the perspective of the investor is the full protection and 
security (FPS) clause. This is largely due to the fact that it is a provision that an investor 
depends on for physical safety especially in instances where there may be armed conflict or 
any other civil unrest which could affect the investment.330 A foreign investor expects to 
have security and protection in a secure and safe environment,331 especially after investing 
large sums of capital in the host state. Moreover, investors contribute immensely to the 
                                                          
328 Article 5 of the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
The Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment signed 19 
February 2008. 
329 Article 3.1 China – Zimbabwe BIT, article 4.1 Germany – Zimbabwe BIT, article 3.1 Netherlands – Zimbabwe 
BIT, article 3.1 South Africa - Zimbabwe BIT and article 4 para 1 of Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT. 
330 Schreuer  C ‘Full Protection and Security’ (2010) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 2. 
331 Saclacuse JW The Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual, and International 
Frameworks for Foreign Capital (2013) 355. 
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economy of a country332 and thus governments should be incentivised to provide security 
and protection. However, the extent of this protection is questionable, whether it extends 
beyond physical protection or not.333 
In its nature, the FPS clause is not half as notorious and controversial as its sibling FET.334 
Although tribunals have refused to hold governments to an absolute standard of strict 
liability,335 the degree of diligence expected of states is high, and it is not necessarily 
proportionate to the resources available,336 particularly to developing countries like 
Zimbabwe. When considering the BITs of Zimbabwe, they vary in how the standard is 
written. The Switzerland – Zimbabwe BIT and South Africa - Zimbabwe BIT are similar. They 
both refer to ‘full protection and security’. It brings to question how the tribunal could 
interpret this provision whether it applies to only physical protection or could extend 
beyond that as in the Occidental Case.337 
The Netherlands – Zimbabwe BIT inserts ‘physical’ to the FPS standard, so it is clear what 
that entails. Allowing for the FSP to extend to instances where there is no physical damage 
then creates a broad spectrum on which investors can sue. In Occidental Exploration Ltd v 
Republic of Ecuador338 the Tribunal read the FPS standard so broadly that it found Ecuador 
in breach of the standard because it had changed its interpretation of tax law and began 
denying value added tax reimbursements.339 Moreover, it may not reflect on the parties’ 
intention to interpret FPS that broadly. 
                                                          
332 See generally Alfaro L, Chanda A, Kalemli-Ozcan S & Sayek S ‘How Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote 
Economic Growth? Exploring the Effects of Financial Markets on Linkages’ Harvard Business School Working 
Paper Summaries September 2006 available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-013.pdf 
(accessed 16 May 2017), Khaliq A & Noy I ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Imperial Evidence 
from Sectoral Data in Indonesia’ March 2007 available at 
http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_07-26.pdf  (accessed 16 May 2017). 
333 The question arises after there were two diverging judgments in Saluka and Azurix. 
334 Malik M ‘The Full Protection and Security Standard Comes of Age: Yet Another Challenge for States in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ The International Institute for Sustainable Development 2011 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/full_protection.pdf(accessed 8 May 2017) 1. 
335 Malik M ‘The Full Protection and Security Standard Comes of Age: Yet Another Challenge for States in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ The International Institute for Sustainable Development 2011 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/full_protection.pdf(accessed 8 May 2017) 5. 
336 Malik M ‘The Full Protection and Security Standard Comes of Age: Yet Another Challenge for States in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ The International Institute for Sustainable Development 2011 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/full_protection.pdf(accessed 8 May 2017) 5. 
337 Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd v Republic of Ecuador  LCIA Case No. UN3467. 
338 Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd v Republic of Ecuador  LCIA Case No. UN3467 
339 Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd v Republic of Ecuador  para 183-187. 
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South Africa’s approach340 to the FPS requirement in international investment law is a good 
example of how to be risk averse with the provision. In the PI Act, protection provided for is 
subject to the resources available.341 Essentially, host states must be prepared to give 
security and protection, and at the same time ensure they are not committing to 
protections that will deplete tax payer’s money and burden national reserves. For 
Zimbabwe, BITs refer to FPS without subjecting such to available resources. This creates 
problems for a developing poor country like Zimbabwe that is already swimming in 
international debt, to open itself to an onerous standard of protection it can little afford. 
Therefore, it is imperative to revisit its BITs and balance these provisions. 
 
3.4.5 Expropriation: Indirect Expropriation342  
 
The BITs Zimbabwe is a party to expressly provide for direct expropriation and indirect 
expropriation. For example, the Germany – Zimbabwe BIT reads: 
‘(2) Investments by nationals or companies of either contracting parties shall not be 
expropriated, nationalised or subjected to any other measure the effect of which would be 
tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation in the territory of another Contracting 
Party.’343 
However, the BITs are silent to whether or not state police powers344 exercised through 
regulation could amount to expropriation. Although in theory, a state has a right to regulate, 
in practice it is not necessarily so with the presence of BITs. As seen in cases adjudicated by 
international tribunals, investors can challenge regulatory measures that may diminish the 
investment in any way.345 In Ethyl Corporation v Canada,346 Canada was sued by the investor 
                                                          
340 As provided for in the Protection of Investment Act 
341 Section 9 of the Protection of Investment Act No. 22 of 2015. 
342 Article 4 China – Zimbabwe BIT, article 4.2 Germany – Zimbabwe BIT, article 6 Netherlands – Zimbabwe BIT, 
article 5 South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT and article 6 Switzerland –Zimbabwe BIT. 
343 Article 4(2) of the Germany – Zimbabwe BIT. 
344 This is a doctrine that recognises host stat’s right to regulate or take measures that may significantly affect 
investor’s property interests without compensation in some instances. See Henckels C ‘Indirect Expropriation 
and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-state 
Arbitration’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 225. 
345 Pelc KJ ‘Does the International Investment Regime Induce Frivolous Litigation?’  May 2016 available at 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/42486/frivolity.pdf (accessed 21 May 2017) 1. 
346 Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 1997. 
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for banning the import and transportation of MMT. The banned product was the investor’s 
product, and was considered by the government of Canada to be a dangerous toxin.347 
According to the Canadian government, the product could harm health, and cause air 
pollution including the release of greenhouse gases.348 The investors successfully settled 
with the Canadian government including reversal of the ban and legal fees were covered.349 
Under international law, not all state measures interfering with property constitute 
expropriation.350 In fact, state measures, may affect foreign interests considerably without 
amounting to expropriation.351 Government may subject foreign assets to taxation, trade 
restrictions involving licenses and quotas352 in its exercise of police powers.353 Furthermore, 
there are other regulatory measures that must be regarded as essential in the proper 
functioning of the state, such as consumer protection, securities, environmental protection 
and land planning.354  
Moreover, states have different economies and aspirations. As such, regulations and the 
extent of regulations differ. It would be to the detriment of host state parties to be negated 
from regulating towards national interest, unless such regulation is accompanied by 
necessary funds to compensate any investor that would be affected. It is safe to say, the 
poorer the host state, the more its regulatory power is depleted. It is therefore necessary to 
ensure there is an acceptable line drawn between compensable and non-compensable 
forms of regulation. 
Zimbabwe’s BITs are hamstrung by the problem that the expropriation clause could be 
interpreted to negate government from exercising its right to regulate. It is not in dispute 
that once government expropriates, it has to compensate. However, there must be a 
distinction between compensable and non-compensable regulatory measures. To this, 
Zimbabwe must be held to compensate legitimate costs an investor has incurred as a result 
                                                          
347 Sforza M & Vallianatos M ‘Chemical Firm Uses Trade Pact to Contest Environmental Law’ (1997) available at 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212/45381.html (accessed 21 May 2017). 
348 Buckman G Global Trade: Past Mistakes, Future Choices (2013) 174. 
349 Buckman G (2013) 175.  
350 OECD ‘"Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” In International Investment Law’ September 
2004 available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_4.pdf (accessed 8 May 2017) 4. 
351 Brownlie I Public International Law (2008) 509. 
352 As in the case of Zimbabwe currently under Statutory Instrument 62 of 2016, where certain goods were 
banned for balance of payments issues. 
353 Brownlie I (2008) 509. 
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of the exercise of the right to regulate; provided that such compensation is awarded fairly 
especially after being measured against the public good. This guards against unfettered use 
of the right to regulate. Essentially, there needs to be a balance. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter has highlighted problems in the structure of Zimbabwe’s BITs and the 
consequences thereafter. These texts are drafted with loose and vague language which can 
be open to interpretation. Moreover, the BITs do not contain considerations of human 
rights and other national policy objectives that could be of interest to host states. Rather, 
the texts emphasise on investor’s rights and host state obligations. Further to this, some 
standards of treatment provided for in the texts are not accompanied by explanation as to 
what they entail or mean. This creates room for tribunals to interpret widely and arguably 
run counter to state parties’ intention.  
Having an account of the problems Zimbabwe could face with its first generation BITs, it is 
imperative to realise the importance of revisiting the texts. The texts must provide a balance 
by being responsive to practical issues the host government is facing, and not merely focus 
on protecting the interests of the investor. Zimbabwe must therefore take it upon itself to 
be a proponent of a more balanced investment treaty text by renegotiating and amending 
its BITs. There are countries like Canada and India, who have taken different approaches in 
structure and content of their BITs by having treaty models. The following chapter will 
therefore explore different approaches Canada and India have employed in their BIT models 
on pertinent issues surrounding BITs. Apart from these countries, Zimbabwe can also draw 
lessons from SADC FIP, SADC BIT Model treaty and CETA as international best practices. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE BALANCED BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY SYSTEM IN 
ZIMBABWE: LESSONS FROM CANADA, INDIA, SADC AND CETA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Older BITs have been described as imbalanced instruments which are overly protective of 
investor interests at the expense of host states’ regulatory prerogative and pursuit of public 
welfare objectives.355 This gives rise to a pertinent need to reform BITs. However, BIT 
reforms require a reconciliation of competing interests, which is generally difficult to 
attain.356 It is against this background, deliberations on new model treaties and IIA 
negotiations, are working to change prevailing trends.357  
With Zimbabwe having first generation BITs which are faced with challenges, as 
demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, there is therefore much Zimbabwe can learn from 
the above mentioned reform processes. This chapter therefore, discusses how other 
jurisdictions have dealt with problematic treaty provisions and structure of BITs as discussed 
in chapter 3. More specifically, this chapter focuses on Canada and India as jurisdictions to 
learn from. For perspective, the chapter turns to the SADC FIP, SADC Model BIT and 
international best practices as established in one of the most recent comprehensive 
agreements, CETA.  
 
 
 
                                                          
355 Titi C Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment: Survival Clauses and Reform of International Investment Law’ 
(2016) 33 Journal of International Arbitration 426.  
356 Titi C (2016) 426. 
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4.2 BACKGROUND  
 
The powers allocated to foreign investors and to arbitrators under Chapter 11 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were an awakening for Canada to review 
investment regulation by investment treaties.358 As a result, Canada revisited its investment 
treaties, with a view to clarify loose language created by poor drafters.359 Currently, 
Canada’s new treaty practice is espoused in its forward thinking BIT template which moves 
away from the problematic first generation BIT structure. Apart from the BIT template, 
Canada’s treaty practice with some African countries360 has shown its commitment to move 
towards more balanced approaches to BITs. These relatively new investment treaties by 
Canada and some African states are based on the model BIT template.361  
Similarly, India has expressed disenchantment with the current international investment 
regulatory system after being subjected to lawsuits from foreign investors.362 An important 
case in this regard was White Industries v India 363 where the arbitral tribunal found India in 
breach of its obligations under the Australia – India BIT. The principle which the Tribunal 
found to have been violated was imported through an MFN provision from an India–Kuwait 
BIT.364 The tribunal held that India was in violation of its treaty obligation to enable an 
effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.365 This judicial creativity,366 among 
                                                          
358 Van Harten G ‘Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion’ (2010) 2 Trade Law and 
Development 21. 
359 Van Harten G (2010) 22. 
360 Nigeria (May 2014) Cameroon (March 2014), Nigeria (May 2014), Senegal (November 2014), Mali 
(November 2014), Cote d’Ivoire (November 2014), Burkina Faso (April 2015) and most recently Guinea (May 
2015). 
361 Willard R & Morreau S ‘The Canadian Model BIT – A Step in the Right Direction for Canadian Investment in 
Africa?’ Kluwer Arbitration Blog 18 July 2015 available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/07/18/the-
canadian-model-bit-a-step-in-the-right-direction-for-canadian-investment-in-africa/ (accessed 8 June 2017). 
362 See generally Nedumpara J, ‘Imagining Policy Space in India’s Trade and Investment Agreements’ FGV 
Direito SP Research Paper Series 2014 available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532582 (accessed 8 June 2017). 
363 White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL (India-Australia BIT), Award, Nov. 30, 2011. 
364 Langalanga A ‘Imagining South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulatory Regime in a Global Context’ South 
African Institute of International Affairs May 2015 available at https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-
papers/848-imagining-south-africa-s-foreign-investment-regulatory-regime-in-a-global-context/file (accessed 
8 June 2017) 25. 
365 White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL (India-Australia BIT), Award, Nov. 30, 2011 para 
16.1.1. 
366 Langalanga A ‘Imagining South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulatory Regime in a Global Context’ South 
African Institute of International Affairs May 2015 available at https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-
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other things, unsettled the Indian government, which then in turn reviewed its BIT 
programme.367  
Apart from these two jurisdictions, other noteworthy templates that will be considered in 
this chapter are the SADC Model treaty and the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol 
(SADC FIP). Firstly, the SADC FIP has been regarded as a progressive instrument for the 
regional block in terms of investment regulation, showing potential in South to South 
cooperation and mutual learning.368 Initially, the SADC FIP was signed in 2006 and came into 
force in 2010.369 However, Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP (Investment Charter) has been 
repealed by the 2016 Agreement Amending Annex 1 - Cooperation on Investment (2016 
SADC FIP).370 What is of interest is some provisions have been excluded from the 2016 SADC 
FIP text. To this, Zimbabwe must consider this amendment as a learning curve. In its 
preamble, the 2016 SADC FIP draws attention to the problem of unintended consequences 
of some clauses in the 2006 SADC FIP. For instance, the fair and equitable clause is absent in 
the 2016 SADC FIP as a means of limiting these unintended consequences.   
The SADC Model BIT is an important text to refer to as it captures a more balanced and risk 
averse model treaty for investment regulation. Arguably, the 2016 SADC FIP in some 
instances follows the recommendation of the Drafting Committee in relation to some 
clauses such as the NT, FET and MFN clauses.371 Notwithstanding these regional influences, 
international best practices as envisaged in different investment treaties and chapters alike 
make a good point of call in rethinking how to best address problematic treaty provisions. 
Zimbabwe can draw lessons from the CETA’s investment chapter which makes up part of 
international best practices as it is one of the newer investment regulation treaties signed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
papers/848-imagining-south-africa-s-foreign-investment-regulatory-regime-in-a-global-context/file (accessed 
8 June 2017) 25. 
367 Law Commission of India ‘Analysis of the 2015 Draft Model Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty’ Report 260 
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368 Berger A ‘Developing Countries and Future of International Investment Regime’ 2015 Deutsche Gesellschaft 
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SADC Documents and Publication available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
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of the FET clause. See commentary to Article 5 SADC Model BIT 2012. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
58 
 
4.3 NEW APPROACH TO PROBLEMATIC PROVISIONS 
 
4.3.1 National Treatment 
 
In the India Model BIT, the Host State has an obligation to treat domestic and foreign 
investors equally. However, the provision is qualified by requiring the circumstances to be 
‘like’ for an investor to prove that there has been a breach of the NT provision.372 Similarly, 
Canada’s Model BIT on the protection of investments requires like circumstances to be a 
determining factor whether there has been a breach of national treatment or not.373 While 
both model treaties (Canada and India) include the NT clause, India has express exceptions 
to the application of the clause. Notably, India excludes the application of the clause to laws 
or measures of a regional or local government.374 In contrast, Canada includes the coverage 
of the NT to treatment provided by sub-national government.375  
Canada’s Model BIT does not provide for exceptions to the application of the national 
treatment clause. In fact, what is notable in the NT clause under Canada’s Model BIT is 
simply the requirement of like circumstances in order to breach the NT clause. The 
application of national treatment is limited to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments.376  Under 
article 4 (5) of the India Model BIT, there is express exclusion of liability of breach of the NT 
clause in instances where the state offers financial assistance or puts in place measures that 
favour its own investors in pursuit of legitimate public purpose. To this, Zimbabwe can 
attempt such drafting and include its economic empowerment advancements as mandated 
by the Procurement Act and encouraged by the Constitution. 
In the 2016 SADC FIP, the NT provision is provided for under article 6. It requires like 
circumstances to be a determining factor to show breach of the NT clause.377 However, in 
paragraph two of the article, there’s a non-exhaustive list providing guidance on situations 
                                                          
372 Article 4.1 India Model BIT. 
373 Article 3.1 and 3.2 of Canada Model BIT. See also article 4.1 and 4.2 of Canada – Nigeria BIT signed 6 May 
2014. 
374 Article 4.3 India Model BIT. 
375 Article 3.3 Canada Model BIT. 
376 Article 3.1 and 3.2 Canada Model BIT. 
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deemed to be like circumstances.378 Furthermore, the 2016 SADC FIP recognises that states 
may have preferential treatment accorded to domestic investors in pursuit of development 
objectives.379 The NT clause in CETA requires ‘like situations’ for an investor to prove that 
there has been breach of the provision.380 Similar to Canada, the NT provision applies to 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, conduct, operation, management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment and sale or disposal of investments.381 
Zimbabwe may be better suited to employ the 2016 SADC FIP approach to the NT clause in 
its BITs. Firstly, this is because it includes the ‘like circumstances’ requirement, a trait absent 
in most of the NT clauses. Second, it furnishes a non-exhaustive list of what could be 
deemed as ‘like circumstances’.  Lastly, it provides policy space for Zimbabwe to pursue 
economic empowerment by offering preferential treatment to domestic investors, as 
envisaged by its Procurement Laws. 
 
4.3.2 Most-favoured Nation Treatment  
 
The challenge with the MFN clause is its ability to allow investors to create their own 
treaties with the goal of advancing their own interests.382 Currently, Zimbabwe’s BITs 
expose the country to such practices and it calls for Zimbabwe to rethink how it articulates 
the MFN clause. There have been different approaches countries have taken on the MFN 
clause. Some have excluded the clause while others have limited the scope of application of 
the clause.  
India has chosen to remove the clause altogether from its Model BIT. Its rationale is to 
ensure that foreign investors are not able to borrow more beneficial provisions from other 
Indian BITs (treaty shopping).383 Similarly, the SADC Model BIT excludes the MFN clause. It 
                                                          
378 Article 6 para 2 (a) – (f) of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
379 Article 6 para 3 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
380 Article 8.6 para 1 of CETA. 
381 Article 8.6 para 1 of CETA. 
382 See UNCTAD ‘Most-favoured Nation Treatment’ UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
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asserts that BITs must be bilateral and including the MFN clause enables these treaties to 
establish an unintended multilateralisation.384 On the other hand, the Canadian Model BIT 
has not excluded the MFN clause. It provides for it subject to like circumstances and with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and 
sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.385 It excludes all other kinds of 
treatments from being magnetic to the MFN clause, for example dispute resolution. While 
CETA also provides for an MFN clause, it lists the instances when the MFN clause cannot find 
application.386 For example, accreditation of testing and analysis services among other 
things, makes up an old standing arrangement and agreement amongst European countries 
therefore a Canadian entity cannot claim for breach of the MFN treatment.387 
While both the 2006 and 2016 SADC FIP do not include the MFN clause, the SADC Model 
Treaty recommends that should states include the provision, they ought to include 
conditions and limitations by requiring like circumstances and applying only to the 
management, operation and disposition of investments.388 Zimbabwe must consider how 
the MFN clause is ultimately intended to guard against discrimination. To avoid 
multilateralisation of treaty provision, Zimbabwe can emulate what Canada did in its model 
BIT, which is to define the scope of application of the MFN clause. Moreover, Zimbabwe 
may also expressly provide that MFN will not apply to dispute resolution mechanisms as 
provided for under CETA. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
384 SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty with Commentary available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (accessed 24 May 2017) 22. 
385 Article 4 Canada Model BIT. 
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4.3.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment  
 
Another provision found to be problematic in the analysis of Zimbabwe’s BITs is the FET 
clause. This because of expansive interpretation by some tribunals,389 and as such, it has 
been open to varying interpretations.390  There are several options which Zimbabwe could 
consider to employ for a more clear, certain and balanced approach to the FET clause in its 
BITs.  
Canada provides for the FET standard in its Model BIT and links it to the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.391 The linking of the FET 
standard to another customary international law standard, to a certain degree clarifies the 
meaning of the standards and provides guidance to arbitral tribunals (to a greater extent) 
on how to determine breach of the FET clause.  
In contrast, India avoids using the term FET. Rather, India’s Model BIT describes what is 
usually deemed as constituting fair and equitable treatment. Here, it provides for 
obligations on the host state not to subject investments to measures that constitute a denial 
of justice under customary international law, un-remedied and egregious violations of due 
process or abusive treatment involving continuous, unjustified and outrageous coercion or 
harassment.392 
In the 2006 SADC FIP, the FET standard is provided for without explaining what it means or 
linking it to either customary international law or international minimum standard.393 In 
contrast, the 2016 SADC FIP does not include the FET clause. This is because the FET clause 
is viewed as a problematic clause. As noted by the drafters of the 2016 SADC FIP, some of 
the provisions in the 2006 SADC FIP such as the FET clause, have unintended consequences 
for host states. The exclusion of the FET standard does not come with anything in its place.   
The Drafting Committee of SADC Model BIT also shared a similar view to that of the drafters 
of the 2016 SADC FIP.  They recommended against the inclusion of the FET standard owing 
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to its expansive and controversial interpretation.394 The Drafting Committee however, gave 
options on how to articulate the FET clause should a state insist on its inclusion. First, the 
SADC Model BIT recommends linking FET to customary international law on the treatment 
of aliens, in a similar manner to the Canadian approach.395 Further to this, the drafting 
committee noted that the investor should be  required to show  that the ‘act or actions by 
the government are an outrage, in bad faith, a wilful neglect of duty or an insufficiency so 
far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial person would 
readily recognize its insufficiency’.396 
The second option advanced by the SADC Model BIT recommends articulating the FET to 
entail that the state shall not deny administrative and procedural justice to investors.397 
Moreover the administrative, legislative and judicial process should not be arbitrary.398 
Further to this, the second option of FET under the SADC Model BIT, mandates the host 
state to notify investors of administrative or judicial proceedings directly affecting their 
investment.399 
Under CETA, the FET clause is said to have been breached if there has been denial of justice 
in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; fundamental breach of due process, 
including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings; 
manifest arbitrariness; targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as 
gender, race or religious belief; abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and 
harassment among other things.400 CETA’s provision on FET further informs the tribunal of 
the option to401 take into account whether a host state had made a specific representation 
to an investor that created a legitimate expectation. Moreover, that specific representation 
is what the investor relied on, in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment.402 
                                                          
394 SADC Model BIT Commentary available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-
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A preferred option for Zimbabwe would be to adopt the second approach advanced by the 
SADC Model BIT which obliges the host state to refrain from arbitrary processes whether 
administrative, legislative or judicial. However, it remains to be seen whether or not by 
employing this provision, Zimbabwe would have lowered the standard of treatment. If the 
right to due process is already constitutionally enshrined,403 then limiting the FET to the 
approach advanced by the SADC Model BIT would be tantamount to repetition. Thus, even if 
the FET clause as defined by the SADC Model BIT, is excluded, investors would still have 
recourse to the Constitution.  
 
4.3.4 Full Protection and Security  
 
The full protection and security standard (FPS) has been said to be less notorious in investor 
state dispute settlement in comparison to the FET clause.404 However, it could be an equally 
problematic provision if left without legal certainty. The main question around this clause is 
whether or not this protection extends beyond physical protection. Two distinct judgements 
in Saluka405 and Azurix406 are examples of legal uncertainty of the FPS clause owing to 
different interpretations. The Tribunal in Saluka held that the FSP is meant to hold states 
liable if foreign investments have been affected by civil strife and physical violence, and is 
not meant to cover any other impairment of an investor’s investment.407 In contrast, in 
Azurix the Tribunal held that a breach of the FPS can be found to exist even where there is 
no physical violence.408  
It is against this background that drafters of Model BITs and investment chapters have 
addressed the FPS to give clarity and certainty. The Canadian Model BIT, links the FPS to 
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customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.409 In the Indian 
Model BIT, the FPS clause is excluded altogether. 
The SADC Model BIT provides for FPS,410 unlike both the SADC FIPs which are silent on this 
type of protection. The SADC Model BIT limits the application of the FPS to physical 
protection by noting war or other armed conflict, revolution, revolt, insurrection or riot as 
circumstances linked to the FPS.411 Furthermore, the host state is obliged to compensate for 
losses that have incurred and such compensation must be non-discriminatory on an MFN 
basis.412 Examining the CETA text with regard to the FPS clause, it provides that the FPS 
means physical protection.413 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the majority of Zimbabwe’s BITs simply refer to the 
FPS without limiting it to physical protection and security. Accordingly, several lessons can 
be drawn from the brief analysis and description above. The CETA blanket approach to 
speak to physical protection is an option Zimbabwe could consider. 
 
4.3.5 Expropriation: Indirect Expropriation  
 
The challenge with indirect expropriation in Zimbabwe’s BITs is that it does not distinguish 
between compensable and non-compensable forms of expropriation. This distinction is 
important to make as it reduces the risk of Zimbabwe being sued for expropriation in 
instances where it has exercised its legitimate regulatory power.414 As noted in the previous 
chapter, Zimbabwe’s BIT opens up Zimbabwe to risk of such lawsuits owing to its 
unelaborated stance on indirect expropriation.415 
In its Model BIT, Canada speaks to expropriation under article 13. Typically, the provision 
provides that a host state shall not nationalise or expropriate directly or indirectly except for 
a public purpose, in accordance with due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner 
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and on prompt, adequate and effective compensation.416 In Annex B.13(1), the text 
addresses a pertinent issue of what amounts to indirect expropriation. Firstly, the provision 
defines indirect expropriation as resulting from a measure or series of measures by the host 
state, that have an effect equivalent to direct expropriation, although without formal 
transfer of title.417 Further to this, there is a non-exhaustive list on what to consider when 
determining whether or not measures constitute indirect expropriation.418 Similarly, India 
has a non-exhaustive list on what could amount to indirect expropriation.419 
The Canada Model BIT states three pertinent factors of consideration in alleged indirect 
expropriation circumstances. These are, namely: the economic impact of the measure on 
the investment, the extent to which the measure interfere with reasonable expectations of 
the investor; and the character of the measure.420 Although a measure may create adverse 
economic impact on an investment, it does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred.421 India’s Model BIT states that a permanent and complete or near complete 
deprivation of the value of investment may be considered in determining whether or not 
there has been indirect expropriation.422 Further to this, a tribunal would also consider 
whether there has been permanent and complete or near complete deprivation of the 
investor’s right of management and control over the investment.423 This is a non-exhaustive 
list similar to the approach of Canada, although different in content. 
Both the Canadian and Indian Model BITs provide that the exercise of the right to regulate 
in the interest of the public or public welfare objectives such as public health and safety or 
environment, shall not constitute expropriation.424 This is also the same stance the 2016 
SADC FIP takes.425 On the same matter, the 2006 SADC FIP simply reinforces the right to 
regulate without necessarily referring to or directly linking such to indirect expropriation 
instances,426 thus implying that an undertaking of a measure would not constitute indirect 
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expropriation. In CETA, the signatories also reaffirm the right to regulate pursuant to 
protection of public health, safety, the environment among other things.427 Of all the 
discussed texts, the Indian model BIT negates a tribunal from reviewing the host state’s 
exercise of regulatory power to determine whether the measure in question was taken for a 
public purpose or in compliance with its law.428  
The approach of India to limit a tribunal’s power to scrutinise a measure, can be examined 
from two prisms. On the face of it, it may affect the ability of the tribunal to fully exercise its 
powers and determine a case on all its merits. It would be in the interest of justice to 
examine the measure and determine whether or not it was a legitimate measure or simply 
unfettered use of right to regulate. However, the Indian approach could be argued as wise. 
There have been questions raised on whether individuals appointed on an ad hoc basis 
possess the sufficient legitimacy to assess state acts, especially those relating to sensitive 
public policy issues.429  One of the central challenges of arbitrators in ISDS lies in the fact 
that they are also lawyers and lecturers among other things, and therefore exposed to 
conflict of interest.430 To add on, the ISDS arbitration system lacks binding jurisprudence,431 
which is one of the major elements that gives domestic courts legitimacy and consistency. 
Thus, arbitrators can award damages without having to apply limitations on state liability or 
referring to jurisprudence as would be the norm in domestic courts.432  
From the discussion above, it is apparent that Zimbabwe has quite the large pool of choices 
to choose from. The best approach that Zimbabwe could employ in its own BITs to address 
indirect expropriation and the right to regulate would be that of India. 
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4.4 OTHER ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
In addition to addressing traditional treaty clauses in BITs, other jurisdictions have added 
more provisions in pursuit of more elaborate texts. By doing so, it may be regarded as 
pursuing a more balanced BIT system. For example, the right to regulate as a standalone 
clause has been put forward in both the SADC FIPs. Arguably, this is to counter any 
interpretation or practice that may be to the severe detriment of the host state. However, 
to revisit BITs and merely reduce protections traditionally offered by first generation BITs 
would be flipping the same side of a coin. Rather, both the state and investor must have 
rights and obligations provided in BITs.  
 
4.4.1 Right to regulate  
 
One of the most debated areas in international investment law is the right to regulate. Host 
state parties have time and again been faced with lawsuits emanating from instances where 
they have exercised their right to regulate.433 Some states have expressed their 
discontentment with this and opted to do away with BITs because of a regulatory chill effect 
they submerge governments under.434 A question then arises, on whether or not the right to 
regulate should be expressly provided for in BITs.  
Notably, in the 2016 and 2006 SADC FIP, the right to regulate is guaranteed.435 Similarly, the 
SADC Model BIT, provides that a state should have the right to regulate.436 This is to ensure 
that its territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, and 
other legitimate social and economic policy objectives.437 Neither one of these provisions 
are provided for in Zimbabwe’s BITs.  
Apart from regional influences Zimbabwe can consider for inspiration, Zimbabwe can also 
examine what has been done in other jurisdictions. For example, India reaffirms the right to 
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regulate and the need to utilise policy space.438  Its Model BIT notes that the right to 
regulate also includes change of laws and policy that may change the conditions applicable 
to investments.439 Canada does not expressly provide for the right to regulate, but provides 
that state parties can regulate to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
health, safety and the environment.440  
In the CETA text, parties recognise that the provisions in the text preserves the right to 
regulate and flexibility of states to achieve legitimate policy objectives such as public health, 
safety, environment, public morals and the promotion and protection of cultural 
diversity.441 Although investors are to expect protection of their investments as guaranteed 
by the CETA agreement, the right to regulate would not be undermined.442 Although the 
right to regulate under Article 23.2 of CETA is not under the text’s Investment Chapter, it is 
nonetheless important as it would have a nexus on the investments undertaken through 
CETA. Under this provision, labour laws, policies and standards shall be continually 
encouraged through modification of the law.443 Furthermore, environmental protection is 
another area CETA signatories affirm the right to regulate.444 
 
4.4.2 Disclosure 
 
Newer treaties require investors to disclose information about their entities. In the Indian 
Model BIT, investors are required to disclose true and complete information regarding their 
activities, structure, financial situation, performance, relationships with affiliates, 
ownership, governance, or other matters.445 Disclosure of source of funds is also something 
India has obliged investors to do under its model BIT. This requires investors to show 
appropriate documentary evidence establishing the legitimacy of their funds.446 For the 
                                                          
438 India Model BIT, preamble. 
439 India Model BIT, preamble. From this, one can note that there is a nexus between the right to regulate and 
indirect expropriation. This was clear in the Foresti case, where the South African government exercised its 
right to regulate through the Black Economic Empowerment law and policy thus impaired the investment. 
440 Annex B.13 (1) (c) Canada Model BIT. 
441 CETA, preamble. Article 8.9 para 1 of CETA. 
442 CETA, preamble. 
443 Article 23.2 of CETA. 
444 Article 24.3 of CETA. 
445 Article 10.1 India Model BIT. 
446 Article 10.2 India Model BIT. 
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purposes of proving an alleged breach of treaty provisions, investors are mandated to 
maintain true and complete copies of the records, books of account and current financial 
statements.447 Furthermore, investors are expected to maintain accounting records and 
financial statements prepared in currency of the Host State in accordance with principles of 
accounting generally accepted in the Host State.448 
Similarly, the SADC Model BIT recognises the need to have investment disclosure for the 
purposes of carrying forward anti-corruption, fraud and misrepresentation in making 
investments.449 Accordingly, the investor shall provide information as the state may require 
with regard to corporate history and practices of the investor.450 While disclosure may be 
made public,451 the host state is required to protect confidential business information that 
would prejudice the competitive position of the investor.452 The CETA text provides that 
investors are under an obligation to disclose information to the host state, and the host 
state to protect such information where its public disclosure would prejudice the 
competitive position of the investor.453 While it is an obligation to disclose business 
information, the state is required to make such requests reasonably and refrain from unduly 
burdensome demands.454  
This clause would come as a huge benefit for Zimbabwe if it is made part of its BITs. This is 
especially in light of USD$15 billion unaccounted for by government from diamond mines.455 
The precious stone can assist in the revitalising of the economy if exploited well. However, 
investors privileged enough to mine for the stone have proven that disclosure of operations 
needs to be done. Disclosure also assists members of parliament to act on complete and 
correct information in exercising parliamentary oversight. The benefit of this provision to 
                                                          
447 Article 10.3 India Model BIT. 
448 Article 10.4 India Model BIT. 
449Commentary on Article 10 SADC Model BIT. 
450 Article 12.1 SADC Model BIT. 
451 Article 12.4 SADC Model BIT. 
452 Article 12.4 SADC Model BIT. 
453 Article 8.17 of CETA. 
454 Article 8.17 of CETA. 
455 The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe made these allegations at his 92nd birthday celebrations in 2016. 
He further blamed Chinese investors of looting, thus the country missing US$15 billion in revenue. See ANA 
‘Zimbabwean president Mugabe announces $15 billion in diamonds looted’ Sowetan Live 4 March 2016 
available at http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/03/04/zimbabwean-president-mugabe-announces-15-
billion-in-diamonds-looted (accessed 5 June 2017).  
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Zimbabwe is that it assists in the guard against fraudulent activities investors may be 
engaged in. 
 
4.4.3 Transparency 
 
To complement the right to regulate, transparency of the host state is required by some of 
these new BITs. The tenants of this clause speaks to transparency by the host state with 
regard to laws and regulations having a direct effect on investments. This clause is a trait 
short in Zimbabwe’s BITs and arguably, makes a wise clause for Zimbabwe to show good 
faith of its dealings with investments given its tarnished image of investment protection.  
In Canada’s Model BIT, state parties are required to publish laws and regulations that apply 
to investments.456 The publication of these new rules and regulations is also necessary for 
full transparency, especially for interested persons.457 Under the CETA text, transparency is 
regarded as a tenant under the FET clause.458 
Transparency is also articulated under Article 7 of the 2016 SADC FIP. It is mandated for 
states to establish confidence, stability, predictability, trust and integrity by adhering to 
transparent practices and procedures relating to investments.459 This is also the same stance 
the 2006 SADC FIP adopted.460 Further to this, under the 2016 SADC FIP, member states are 
required to notify the SADC Secretariat of new regulations that affect provisions in the 
Investment Annex, within a period of three months of introducing the regulations.461  
 
4.4.4 Investor responsibility  
 
There is now a new thrust to put responsibility on investors. In doing so, investment 
regulatory instruments such as the SADC FIP have included an investor responsibility clause. 
In the 2006 SADC FIP, such responsibility is couched as ‘corporate responsibility’, mandating 
                                                          
456 Article 19.1 Canada Model BIT. 
457 Article 19.1 Canada Model BIT. 
458 Article 8.10 (2) of CETA. 
459 Article 7.1 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
460 Article 8 SADC FIP 2006. 
461 Article 7.2 2016 SADC FIP. 
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investors to abide by the laws, regulations, administrative guidelines and policies of the host 
state.462 This is similar to the 2016 SADC FIP drafting.463 By having such a provision, it sees 
the attempt to balance rights and obligations, by holding investors accountable to laws of 
the host state. These laws would include labour, environment, corporate governance and 
many others which may have direct effect on an investment.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter examined the approaches employed in other jurisdictions as well as in other 
selected texts in jurisdictions to addressing the problems in BITs. A number of expositions 
were made in these discussions. For example, it was highlighted that in some documents 
key provisions such as the MFN have been done away with. This is because of the MFN 
clause has the unintended consequence of multilaterisation of BITs. While India has done 
away with the clause, Canada in its model BIT limits the instances where the MFN clause can 
apply. Similarly, CETA provides the same by limiting the MFN clause to apply to 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other 
disposition of investments. The NT in most texts examined in this chapter are qualified, 
requiring like circumstances to be a factor and other factors such as the sector the 
investment is in and aim of the measure that is discriminating against investors.  
With regard to the FET clause, most of the texts have removed the clause and have either 
replaced it or done away with it completely. For instance, the 2006 SADC FIP had the FET 
clause, but the 2016 SADC FIP amending the 2006 text has completely done away with the 
clause. Other approaches to the FET clause have been to elaborate what it means as 
undertaken by CETA. The FPS clause has been quite consistent in all texts, and has been 
explicit to refer only to physical protection. Finally, indirect expropriation has been given a 
more elaborate definition, with a distinction between compensable and non-compensable 
regulatory measures. Further to this, most texts have reaffirmed the state’s right to 
regulate. 
                                                          
462 Article 10 SADC FIP 2006. 
463 Article 8 2016 SADC FIP. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
72 
 
There have been other clauses that seek to balance out rights and obligations of state 
parties and investors. Some texts have expressly provided for the right to regulate in the 
body of the treaty, while other have reaffirmed the right in preambles. To balance this right 
to regulate, transparency is required on part of the host government. This is to say 
regulations or laws that may affect investments would need to be published and in some 
instances allow for comments from stakeholders. Disclosure on part of investors is seen as a 
way to ensure against corrupt or fraudulent activities in the host state. In summation, the 
chapter has seen different approaches employed with the intention to create more 
balanced BITs. In the following chapter, the thesis will recommend which provisions 
Zimbabwe should employ and why.     
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine Zimbabwe’s BITs, identify the problems associated 
with them and propose reform towards more balanced BITs. In order to address this aim, 
the thesis examined Zimbabwe’s ‘in-force’ BITs, which are first generation BITs. To provide 
perspective to the discussion, the thesis examined the practices from selected jurisdictions 
and instruments. From this discussion, lessons were drawn which are instructive for this 
chapter. This chapter furnishes a conclusion of the main discussions in the thesis and lastly 
recommends alternative versions of current and future provisions.  
 
5.2 CONCLUSION  
 
The thesis first discussed in chapter 2, a historical development of international investment 
regulation till the time of BITs taking centre stage. Initially, investments were regulated by 
colonial rule and FCN treaties. However, the independence of states saw change in 
government did not secure, to a large extent, investments of traditional capital exporting 
states. Post-colonial period was characterised with divide in opinion over investment 
regulation. Newly independent states were adamant to preserve their sovereignty and have 
control over natural resources and the entities that exploited those resources. This is seen 
by the position asserted by the Calvo and Drago doctrine. These doctrines were specifically 
in response to the interventionist stance traditional capital exporting states took when 
claiming for debts owed to their nationals. The tenants of both the Calvo and Drago 
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doctrines were on non-interventionist and national treatment.464 These positions were 
rejected by capital exporting states, who opined that the long standing standards of 
treatment of aliens practiced by the global north should stand as the acceptable standards 
governing investments in post-colonial times. 
The chaotic environment of investment regulation was later met with attempts to regulate 
investments under a multilateral agreement. This attempt was seen in the Havana Charter 
of 1948. Although the Charter was mainly on trade, it also touched on investment 
regulation. Provisions at the core of treatment of aliens like minimum standard of treatment 
and rules on expropriation were not addressed. The Havana Charter failed owing to several 
other reasons, including failure to address pertinent issues on standards of treatment. 
Another multilateral attempt to regulate investments was through the MAI, which failed. 
These failures at a multilateral level presented an opportunity to negotiate investment 
protection at a bilateral level. Thus, there was an emergence of BITs and their popularity to-
date. The purpose of BITs was to reconcile differences between developed and developing 
countries with regard to standards of treatment and investment regulation overall.465 
Another purpose of BITs is to restate the principles of international law as well as generally 
catalyse investment by reducing political risk. Notwithstanding their popularity as an 
instrument that governs investments, BITs present several problems.  
In Chapter 3, the thesis zoomed in on Zimbabwe’s BITs that are in force. First, there was an 
examination of the structure of BITs. Noted by this examination, was how Zimbabwe’s BITs 
are generally short texts, characterised by loose imprecise language. Secondly, there was an 
analysis of individual provisions, namely the national treatment clause (NT), the most-
favoured nation treatment clause (MFN), the fair and equitable treatment clause (FET), full 
protection and security clause (FPS) and expropriation clause. The discussion in Chapter 3 
concluded that to a large extent, Zimbabwe’s BITs are problematic and unbalanced. This is 
mainly because the clauses have neither explanation nor qualification. Moreover, because 
the majority of the BITs were negotiated and signed before there were some critical 
changes in Zimbabwe’s laws, the texts are not reflective of the laws of Zimbabwe that may 
affect investments.  
                                                          
464 See part 2.2 of this thesis. 
465 See part 2.3 of this thesis. 
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Having discussed problems with Zimbabwe’s BITs, Chapter 4 discussed possible solutions 
from other jurisdictions. This was done by critically analysing typical BIT clauses in model 
treaties of Canada and India, and investment chapters in the SADC FIP and CETA. The 
Chapter analysed each clause individually, comparing each to the four texts that were 
selected. The main findings of this Chapter was that there have been reform to foreign 
investment regulation. These clauses were expanded, explained and qualified. Furthermore, 
the right to regulate was reinforced with the aim to address the issue of indirect 
expropriation. Apart from addressing common BIT clauses, the Chapter highlighted that in 
pursuit of more balanced texts, BITs have taken form to include other provisions that place 
an obligation upon the investor. For example, an obligation to disclose company books for 
the purposes of host governments to have oversight on investments. The Chapter briefly 
suggested possible solutions to the problems of Zimbabwe’s BITs, however 
recommendations below will exhaustively lay out how best Zimbabwe can address its 
problems. 
 
5.3 A PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING ZIMBABWE’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
Zimbabwe could either repeal or amend its BITs. If Zimbabwe repeals its BITs, the sunset 
clause found in most of these texts would still allow for the protection under first 
generation BITs to be operational.466 On the other hand, if Zimbabwe opts for amendment, 
it must be aware that it is not a unilateral act, both parties must agree to those 
amendments. Either one of the options is something Zimbabwe must consider nonetheless. 
Apart from amending and repealing, it is also recommended that Zimbabwe has a model 
treaty as done by Canada and India, which sets out investment treaty practice to follow for 
consistency. This section will recommend how best to approach each provision for 
amendment, and new treaty clauses are proposed.  
 
                                                          
466 Article 12.2 China – Zimbabwe BIT, Article 12.2 Germany- Zimbabwe BIT, Article 14.1 Netherlands – 
Zimbabwe BIT, Article 12.2 South Africa Zimbabwe BIT and Article 12.1 Switzerland Zimbabwe BIT. 
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5.3.1 National Treatment Clause 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the NT clause in Zimbabwe’s BITs is problematic because it is 
unqualified and could attract lawsuits because of preferential treatment currently given to 
Zimbabwean businesses.467 To this, it is recommended that Zimbabwe must firstly, do away 
with indigenising foreign owned businesses. That way, it can compete with other SADC 
countries in terms of attracting investment. Given the similar economies of the SADC 
regional block, it is highly detrimental for Zimbabwe to continue mandating foreign owned 
businesses to an ownership threshold.468 When indigenisation law is repealed, it then 
becomes necessary to qualify the NT clause. 
By qualifying the NT clause, Zimbabwe can still keep its preferential treatment without 
attracting lawsuits that may be expensive to go through and settle. It is thus, recommended 
that Zimbabwe employ the approach advanced by the 2016 SADC FIP. This approach has 
three characteristics that best suit Zimbabwe to employ. First, the application of the NT 
clause is limited to the operation, management and disposition of the investment.469 
Secondly, there is a requirement that circumstances must be like.470 Furthermore, it is 
recommended that Zimbabwe’s new NT provision give direction on how like circumstances 
can be examined. This a wise formulation advanced by the 2016 SADC FIP, which requires a 
case-by-case analysis of circumstances and a non-exhaustive list that includes the sector the 
investment is in, and the measure of the aim concerned.471 Finally, the 2016 SADC FIP 
recognises that a host state may want to pursue national development objectives, therefore 
allows for preferential treatment in that regard.472 
 
 
                                                          
467 See part 3.4.1 of this thesis. 
468 There are ‘safe havens’ for investments within SADC, which are basically countries that do not require an 
ownership limit and thus investors would simply choose not to invest in Zimbabwe. See Kondo T ‘Investment 
Law in a Globalised Environment: A Proposal for a New Investment Regime in Zimbabwe’ (Unpublished LLD 
Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2017) 323. 
469 Article 6.1 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
470 Article 6.1 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
471 Article 6.2 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
472 Article 6.3 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
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5.3.2 Most-favoured Nation Treatment 
 
Although some jurisdictions like India have done away with the MFN clause, other treaty 
practices like that of Canada and the CETA retained the MFN clause. As highlighted in 
Chapter 4, an option available to address the unintended multilaterisation of BITs by this 
clause is to limit its application.473 It is therefore recommended that Zimbabwe keeps the 
MFN clause, however limit its scope of application to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments as 
advanced by the Canada Model BIT.474 Further to this, it is recommended that Zimbabwe 
subjects the MFN treatment to operate only in like circumstances as provided for by the 
Canada Model BIT.475  
 
5.3.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment 
 
Among problematic provisions in BITs, the FET clause has been one of the most notorious 
given its unknown contents overall.476 Leaving the common clause open to interpretation 
exposes Zimbabwe to numerous lawsuits. It is against this background that a 
recommendation to furnish the FET as advanced by the SADC Model BIT is put forward. This 
means that in its BITs, Zimbabwe will keep the traditional clause, and define it as creating an 
obligation for the host state to refrain from arbitrary processes against the investor. In 
essence, the host state shall not deny administrative and procedural justice to investors.477 
Finally, the host state should notify investors of administrative or judicial proceedings 
directly affecting their investment.478  
 
 
                                                          
473 See part 4.3.2 of this thesis. 
474 Article 4 Canada Model BIT. 
475 Article 4 Canada Model BIT. 
476 See part 3.4.3 of this thesis. 
477 Article 5.1 SADC Model BIT, Option 2. 
478 Article 5.2 SADC Model BIT, Option 2. 
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5.3.4 Full Protection and Security  
 
The problem with the FPS clause has been that in some instances, it has been interpreted 
widely to include protection beyond physical protection.479 To this, some jurisdictions and 
drafters have expressly provided what is meant by the FPS, limiting it to physical protection 
for the most part.480 It is therefore recommended Zimbabwe employs the straightforward 
approach advanced by CETA, of defining the FPS as physical protection. However, for 
avoidance of an onerous standard, Zimbabwe must further qualify this to provide that such 
protection would be subject to available resources.481 By doing this, Zimbabwe commits to 
protection it can actually provide as opposed to that which may burden its national 
reserves. 
 
5.3.5 Expropriation: Indirect Expropriation  
 
The thesis has discussed that there are regulations that may have effect on an investment. 
When this happens, indirect expropriation is said to have taken place.482 However, it is 
essential for states to regulate activities within their borders for several reasons. To this, it 
becomes a problem if every regulatory measure can be compensable. It is essential for 
Zimbabwe to revisit the clause for the purposes of distinguishing between compensable 
regulatory measures and non-compensable regulatory measures. This has been one of 
numerous problems of Zimbabwe’s BITs. It is therefore recommended that Zimbabwe 
distinguishes between compensable and non-compensable regulatory measures by 
emulating what India has done.  
Firstly, it is important to have a non-exhaustive list of what could amount to indirect 
expropriation. A permanent and complete or near complete deprivation of the value of 
investment may be considered in determining whether or not there has been indirect 
                                                          
479 See part 3.4.4 of this thesis. 
480 See part 4.3.4 of this thesis. 
481 This is what South Africa provided for in its Protection of Investment Act under section 9. 
482 See part 3.4.5 of this thesis. 
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expropriation.483 Further to this, has there been permanent and complete or near complete 
deprivation of the investor’s right of management and control over the investment.484 There 
must be evidence to show that there was an appropriation by the host state, which results 
in transfer of the value of the investment to the host state or a third party.485 
Second, it is recommended that Zimbabwe provides that the exercise of the right to 
regulate in the interest of the public or public welfare objectives such as public health and 
safety or environment, shall not constitute expropriation.486 Although India has excluded a 
tribunal from critically analysing new laws and regulations for the purposes of finding 
legitimacy of the same,487 it is an approach that the writer recommends against in the case 
of Zimbabwe. This is mainly because it is in the interest of justice that a tribunal scrutinise, 
to a certain degree, the measures undertaken by government in its exercise of the right to 
regulate in an effort to determine whether or not the measure is legitimate and in the 
interest of the state at large.  
 
5.3.6 Right to regulate 
 
As a compliment to an elaborate indirect expropriation clause, it is imperative that 
Zimbabwe further reinforce its right to regulate, pursuant to public interest. Some model 
BITs have reinforced this right, and treaty practice as seen by the SADC FIP and CETA.488 It is 
recommended that Zimbabwe expressly provides for the right to regulate and for the 
purposes of the flexibility to achieve legitimate policy objectives such as public health and 
safety, and environment as done by CETA signatories.489 Further to this, Zimbabwe must 
realise that issues like environment, labour and health are generally acceptable and 
relatable throughout the world. However, issues of economic empowerment of indigenous 
or previously marginalised persons may only be peculiar to Zimbabwe and developing 
countries at large. Thus, it is recommended that in reforming BITs, Zimbabwe should 
                                                          
483 Article 5.2 (i) of India Model BIT. 
484 Article 5.2 (ii) of India Model BIT. 
485 Article 5.2 (iii) of India Model BIT. 
486 Article 5.4 of India Model BIT. Annex B.13 (1) (c) Canada Model BIT. 
487 Article 5.5 India Model BIT. See also part 4.3.5 of this thesis. 
488 See part 4.4.1 of this thesis. 
489 CETA, preamble. 
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emulate what the SADC Model Treaty advances with regard to development objectives. This 
states that governments should ensure that their territories are consistent with goals and 
principles of sustainable development, and other legitimate social and economic policy 
objectives.490  
In summation, the BITs of Zimbabwe should reinforce the right to regulate pursuant to 
public interest in health and safety, environment and labour. Furthermore, expressly 
provide that in the exercise of the right to regulate, states will be on a quest to ensure that 
their territories are mindful of legitimate social and economic policy objectives through 
economic empowerment laws among other things mandated or encouraged by the 
Constitution and laws. While it is recommended that Zimbabwe expressly provides for this, 
it is imperative that such laws be reasonable and refrain from interfering unjustifiably with 
foreign investments. Zimbabwe can empower its domestic investors without unduly 
interfering with foreign investments. For example, preferential treatment currently 
provided for under government procurement would not necessarily interfere with the 
operation or enjoyment of foreign investments, whereas indigenising foreign owned 
businesses would.491 
 
5.3.7 Disclosure 
 
Pursuant to the exercise of parliamentary oversight on investments, the disclosure clause is 
a key element in ensuring against fraudulent activities. This is an important clause to employ 
for Zimbabwe, in light of the diamond revenue scandal and allegations put forward against 
foreign investors.492  It is therefore recommended that Zimbabwe employs the disclosure 
clause. This clause would require investors to disclose true and complete information 
regarding their activities, structure, financial situation, performance, relationships with 
                                                          
490 Article 20.1 SADC Model BIT. 
491 See part 3.4.1 of this thesis. 
492 The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe made allegations, at his 92nd birthday celebrations in 2016, that 
there was revenue missing from diamond mining. He further blamed Chinese investors of looting, thus the 
country missing US$15 billion in revenue. See ANA ‘Zimbabwean president Mugabe announces $15 billion in 
diamonds looted’ Sowetan Live 4 March 2016 available at 
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/03/04/zimbabwean-president-mugabe-announces-15-billion-in-
diamonds-looted 
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affiliates, ownership, governance, or other matters.493 Further to this, Zimbabwe should 
demand any other corporate history and practices of the investor.494 Moreover, investors 
should be expected to maintain accounting records and financial statements prepared in 
currency of the Host State in accordance with principles of accounting generally accepted in 
the Host State.495  
Although disclosure is important, there is a need to strike a balance between such disclosure 
being made public, and protection of confidential information of the investor. Thus, it is 
recommended that there be an obligation on the Host State to protect confidential business 
information that would prejudice the competitive position of the investor.496 Moreover, it is 
recommended that this clause place an obligation on Zimbabwe as a host state to act 
reasonably, by making requests of disclosure reasonable and refrain from unduly 
burdensome demands.497 
 
5.3.8 Transparency  
 
To balance the right to regulate by the host state, it is imperative to place an obligation on 
the host state to be transparent in its implementation of its laws, particularly those having a 
direct effect on foreign investments. It is recommended that the transparency clause be 
employed in Zimbabwe’s BITs, obligating state parties to publish laws and regulations that 
apply to investments,498 with the purpose of establishing confidence, stability, predictability, 
trust and integrity by adhering to transparent practices and procedures relating to 
investments.499 
 
 
 
                                                          
493 Article 10.1 India Model BIT. 
494 Article 12.1 SADC Model BIT. 
495 Article 10.4 India Model BIT. 
496 Article 12.4 SADC Model BIT. 
497 Article 8.17 of CETA. 
498 Article 19.1 Canada Model BIT.  
499 Article 7.1 of the 2016 SADC FIP. 
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5.4 CLOSING REMARKS 
 
The thesis has therefore established the problems with Zimbabwe’s BITs and the need to 
revisit them for reform. Such reform is conscious of the discussions and practices around 
international investment law. Following is an annexure detailing a proposed model BIT. 
Whilst the model BIT provides more provisions than that discussed as problems in the 
thesis,500 it was worthwhile to include all provisions for a full model BIT text. The proposed 
model BIT is derived from the South – Africa Zimbabwe BIT, which is a more recent 
agreement signed by Zimbabwe. The focus is on the five provisions discussed throughout 
this thesis and new clauses identified and discussed in this thesis as options to consider for 
more balanced texts.  
(30 141 words)  
                                                          
500 See part 1.7 of this study, where a discussion of the limitation of study is undertaken.  
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ANNEXURE  
 
 
Proposed Model Text for Zimbabwe’s Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
BETWEEN 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 
AND 
………… 
FOR THE PROMOTION AND RECIPROCAL 
PROTECTION 
OF INVESTMENTS 
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PREAMBLE 
 
The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Government of … (hereinafter jointly 
referred to as the "Parties", and separately as a "Party"); 
 
DESIRING to create favourable conditions for greater investment by investors of either Party in 
the territory of the other Party; and 
 
RECOGNISING that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under international 
agreement of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business 
initiative and will increase prosperity in the territories of both Parties; 
 
HEREBY AGREE as follows: 
 
 
ARTICLE 1 
Definitions 
In this Agreement, unless the context indicates otherwise - 
"investment" means every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes - 
a) movable and immovable property as well as other rights such as mortgages, liens or 
pledges; 
b) shares, stock and debentures of a company and any other form of participation in a 
company; 
c) claims to money, or to any performance under contract having an economic value; 
d) intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, patents, utility model patents, 
registered designs, trade-marks, trade-names, trade and business secrets, technical 
processes, know-how, and goodwill; and 
e) rights or permits conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to 
search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources;  
and any change in the legal form in which assets are invested or reinvested shall not affect 
their character as investments under this Agreement. 
 
"investor" means in respect to either Party: 
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a) the nationals of a Party, being those natural persons deriving their status as 
nationals of a Party from the domestic law in force in the territory of that Party; and 
b) the "companies" of a Party, being any legal person, corporation, firm or association 
incorporated or constituted in accordance with the domestic law in force in the 
territory of that Party; 
 
"returns" means the amounts yielded by an investment and in particular, though not 
exclusively, includes profits, interest, capital gains, dividends, royalties and fees; 
 
"territory" means - 
a) for the Republic of Zimbabwe, the land and territory of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe and the airspace above it; 
b) for the Republic of … 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
Promotion of Investments 
(1) Each Party shall, subject to its general policy in the field of foreign investment, 
encourage investments in its territory by investors of the other Party and, subject to 
its right to exercise powers conferred by the domestic law of its country, shall admit 
such investments. 
 
(2) Each Party shall grant, in accordance with the domestic law of its country, the 
necessary permits in connection with such investments and with the carrying out of 
licensing agreements and contracts for technical, commercial or administrative 
assistance. 
 
(3) In order to create favourable conditions for assessing the financial position and 
results of activities related to investments in the territory of a Party, that Party shall - 
notwithstanding its own requirements for bookkeeping and auditing - permit the 
investment to be subject also to bookkeeping and auditing according to standards 
which the investor is subjected to by his or its national requirements or according to 
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internationally accepted standards (such as International Accountancy Standards 
(lAS) drawn up by the International Accountancy Standards Committee (IASA) ). The 
results of such accountancy and audit shall be freely transferable to the investor. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
Treatment of Investments 
1) Investments and returns that are reinvested of investors of either Party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment.  
(a) For certainty, fair and equitable treatment does not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond an obligation for the Host State to refrain from arbitrary 
processes against the investor.  
(b) The host state shall not deny administrative and procedural justice to investors. 
 
2) Investments and returns that are reinvested of investors of either Party shall at all 
times enjoy full physical security and protection, subject to available resources. Such 
treatment will be awarded on a national treatment basis.  
 
ARTICLE 4 
Non-discrimination 
1) A State Party shall accord to investors and their investments treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors and their 
investments with respect to the management, operation and disposition of 
investments in its territory. 
 
2) For greater certainty, references to ‘like circumstances’ in paragraph 1 requires an 
overall examination on a case-by-case basis of all the circumstances of an investment 
including, inter alia: 
 
a) its effects on third persons and local community; 
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b) its effects on the local, regional or national environment, including the 
cumulative effects of all investments within a jurisdiction on the environment; 
c) the sector the investor is in; 
d) the aim of the measure concerned; 
e) the regulatory process generally applied in relation to the measure concerned; 
and 
f) other factors directly relating to the investment or investor in relation to the 
measure concerned.  
 
3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, State Parties may, in accordance 
with their respective domestic legislation, grant preferential treatment to domestic 
investments and investors in order to achieve national development objectives.  
 
4) Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of a non-Party with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale 
or other disposition of investments in its territory. 
 
5) The provisions of paragraph 4 shall not be construed so as to oblige one Party to 
extend to the investors of the other Party the benefit of any treatment, preference 
or privilege resulting from 
 
a) any existing or future customs union, free trade area, common market, any 
similar international agreement or any interim agreement leading up to such 
customs union, free trade area, or common market to which either Party is or 
may become a party; or 
b) any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to 
taxation of any domestic legislation relating wholly or mainly to taxation. 
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ARTICLE 5 
Compensation for Expropriation 
1) Investments of investors of either Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or 
subjected to measures having effects equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation 
(hereinafter referred to as "expropriation") in the territory of the other Party except 
for public purposes, under due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and 
against prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Such compensation shall be 
at least equal to the market value of the investment expropriated immediately 
before the expropriation or before the impending expropriation became public 
knowledge, whichever is the earlier, shall include interest at a normal commercial 
rate until the date of payment, shall be made without delay, and shall be effectively 
realisable. 
 
2) The investor affected by the expropriation shall have a right, under the domestic law 
of the country of the Party making the expropriation, to prompt review, by a court of 
law or other independent and impartial forum of that Party, of his or its case and of 
the valuation of his or its investment in accordance with the principles referred to in 
paragraph 1. 
 
3) The determination of whether a Measure or a series of Measures have an effect 
equivalent to expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry, and usually 
requires evidence that there has been: 
a)  permanent and complete or near complete deprivation of the value of 
Investment; and 
b)  permanent and complete or near complete deprivation of the Investor’s right of 
management and control over the Investment 
c)  an appropriation of the Investment by the Host State which results in transfer of 
the complete or near complete value of the Investment to that Party or to an 
agency or instrumentality of the Party or a third party; 
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4) For the avoidance of doubt, the parties also agree that, non-discriminatory 
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives such as public health, safety and the environment shall not 
constitute expropriation.  
 
ARTICLE 6 
The Right to Regulate 
 
1) In accordance with customary international law and other general principles of 
international law, the Host State has the right to take regulatory or other 
measures to ensure that development in its territory is consistent with the goals 
and principles of sustainable development, and with other legitimate social and 
economic policy objectives. 
 
2) The provisions of this Agreement preserve the right of the Parties to regulate 
within their territories and the Parties' flexibility to achieve legitimate policy 
objectives, such as public health, safety, environment, public morals and the 
promotion and protection of cultural diversity 
 
Article 7 
Disclosure 
 
1) Investors and Investments must timely comply with the requirements of the Law 
of the Host State to disclose true and complete information regarding their 
activities, structure, financial situation, performance, relationships with affiliates, 
ownership, governance, or other matters. 
 
2) An Investor shall provide such information to an actual or potential Host State as 
that State Party may require concerning the Investment in question and the 
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corporate history and practices of the Investor, for purposes of decision making 
in relation to that Investment or solely for statistical purposes. 
 
3) Accounting records shall be maintained and financial statements prepared in 
currency of the Host State in accordance with principles of accounting generally 
accepted in the Host State. 
 
4) A Party may require an investor of the other Party, or its covered investment, to 
provide routine information concerning that investment solely for informational 
or statistical purposes, provided that those requests are reasonable and not 
unduly burdensome.  
 
5) The Party shall protect confidential or protected information from any disclosure 
that would prejudice the competitive position of the investor or the covered 
investment. This paragraph does not prevent a Party from otherwise obtaining or 
disclosing information in connection with the equitable and good faith 
application of its laws. 
 
 
Article 8 
Transparency 
1) Each Party shall, to the extent possible, ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures, 
and administrative rulings of general application respecting any matter covered by 
this Agreement are promptly published or otherwise made available in such a 
manner as to enable interested persons and the other Party to become acquainted 
with them. 
 
2) Each Party shall promote and establish predictability, confidence, trust and integrity 
by adhering to and enforcing open and transparent policies, practices, regulations 
and procedures as they relate to investment.  
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ARTICLE 9 
Transfers of Investments and Returns 
1) Each Party shall allow investors of the other Party the free transfer of payments 
relating to their investments and returns, including compensation paid pursuant to 
Articles 5.  
 
2) All transfers shall be effected without delay in any convertible currency at the 
market rate of exchange applicable on the date of transfer. In the absence of a 
market for foreign exchange, the rate to be used shall be the most recent exchange 
rate applied to inward investments or the most recent exchange rate for conversion 
of currencies into Special Drawing Rights, whichever is the more favourable to the 
investor.  
 
3) Transfers shall be done in accordance with the domestic laws in force in the territory 
of the Party, who has admitted the investment. Such domestic laws shall not, 
however, regarding either the requirements or the application thereof, impair or 
derogate from the free and undelayed transfer allowed in terms of paragraph 1 and 
2. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
Investor-state dispute settlement  
 
1) Any legal dispute between an investor of one Party and the other Party relating to an 
investment of the former shall be settled amicably between the two parties concerned. 
 
2)  If the dispute has not been settled within six (6) months from the date at which it was 
raised in writing, the dispute may at the choice of the investor, after notifying the Party 
concerned of its intention to do so in writing, be submitted –  
 
a)  to the competent courts of the Party in whose territory the investment is made; 
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b)  to arbitration by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and nationals of other States, opened for signature at Washington 
DC on 18 March 1965; or 
 
c)  an ad hoc arbitration tribunal, which unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties to 
the dispute, is to be established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
 
3) If the investor submits the dispute to the competent court of the host Party or to 
international arbitration mentioned in paragraph 2, the choice shall be final. 
 
4)  The decision in resolution of the dispute shall be derived by application of the 
domestic law, including the rules relating to conflicts of law, of the country of the 
Party involved in the dispute in whose territory the investment has been made, the 
provisions of this Agreement, the terms of the specific agreement which may have 
been entered into regarding the investment as well as the principles of international 
law. 
 
5)  The award made shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute and shall be 
executed according to the applicable domestic law. 
 
ARTICLE 11 
Dispute between the State Parties 
 
1) Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Agreement shall, if possible, be settled through consultation or negotiations 
between the Parties. 
 
2)  If the dispute cannot thus be settled within a period of six months, following the 
date on which such negotiations were requested by either Party, it shall upon the 
request of either Party be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. 
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3) Such an arbitral tribunal shall be constituted for each individual case in the following 
way: 
a) within three months of the receipt of the request for arbitration, each Party shall 
appoint one member of the tribunal 
 
b)  those two members shall then select a national of a third State who on approval 
by the two Parties shall be appointed Chairman of the tribunal. 
 
c) the Chairman shall be appointed within three months from the date of 
appointment of the other two members. 
 
 
4) If within the periods specified in sub-Article (3) the necessary appointments have not 
been made, either Party may, in the absence of any other agreement, invite the 
President of the International Court of Justice to make any necessary appointments. 
If the President is a national of either Party or is otherwise prevented from 
discharging the said function, the Vice-President shall be invited to make the 
necessary appointments. If the Vice-President is a national of either Party or is also 
prevented from discharging the said function, the Member of the International Court 
of Justice next in seniority who is not a national of either Party shall be invited to 
make the necessary appointments. 
 
5) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute according to this Agreement and the 
principles of international law. The arbitral tribunal shall reach its decision by a 
majority of votes. Such decision shall be binding on both Parties. Each Party shall 
bear the cost of its own member of the tribunal and of its representation in the 
arbitral proceedings; the cost of the Chairman and the remaining cost shall be borne 
in equal parts by the Parties. The tribunal may, however, in its decision direct that a 
higher proportion of costs shall be borne by one of the two Parties. The tribunal shall 
determine its own procedures, unless the Parties agree otherwise. 
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ARTICLE 12 
Subrogation 
 
If a Party or its designated Agency makes a payment to its own investor under a guarantee it 
has given in respect of an investment in the territory of the other Party, the latter Party shall 
recognise the assignment, whether by law or by legal transaction, to the former Party of all 
the rights and claims of the indemnified investor, and shall recognise that the former Party 
or its designated agency is entitled to exercise such rights and enforce such claims by virtue 
of subrogation, to the same extent as the original investor. 
 
 
ARTICLE 13 
Application of other Rules 
 
1) If the provisions of the domestic law of the country of either Party or obligations 
under international law existing at present or established hereafter between the 
Parties in addition to this Agreement contain rules, whether general or specific, 
entitling investments and returns of investors of the other Party to treatment more 
favourable than is provided for by this Agreement, such rules shall, to the extent that 
they are more favourable, prevail over this Agreement. 
 
2) Each Party shall observe any other obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments of investors of the other Party. 
 
 
ARTICLE 14 
Scope of the Agreement 
 
This Agreement shall apply to all investments, whether made before or after the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement, but shall not apply to any property right or interest 
compulsorily acquired by either Party in its own territory before the entry into force of this 
Agreement. 
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ARTICLE 14 
Entry into Force, Duration, Termination and Amendment 
 
1) The Parties shall notify each other when their respective constitutional requirements 
for entry into force of this Agreement have been fulfilled. The Agreement shall enter 
into force thirty (30) days after receipt of the last notification. 
 
2) This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of ten years. Thereafter it shall 
continue in force until the expiration of twelve months from the date on which 
either Party shall have given written notice, through the diplomatic channel, of 
termination to the other. 
 
3) In respect of investments made prior to the date when the notice of termination 
becomes effective, the provisions of Articles 1 to 11 remain in force with respect to 
such investments for a further period of twenty years from that date. 
 
4) The terms of this Agreement may be amended by negotiated agreement between 
the Parties. The Parties shall notify each other through an Exchange of Notes 
through the diplomatic channel when their respective constitutional requirements 
for entry into force of such amendment have been fulfilled. Such amendment shall 
enter into force on the date of receipt of the last notification. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective 
Governments, have signed and sealed this Agreement in two originals in the English 
language, both texts being equally authentic. 
 
 
DONE at ……………………………. on this ……… day of …………………………………………. 2017 
 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE     FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
96 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY   
 
Books 
Becker Lorca A  Mestizo International Law (2014) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bell DVJ & Cheung YA (eds) Introduction to Sustainable Development (2004) Oxford: Eolss 
Publishers. 
Bell DVJ & Cheung YA (eds) Introduction to Sustainable Development (2004) Oxford: Eolss 
Publishers. 
Bjorklund A, Liard IA & Ripinsky S (eds.) Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues. Remedies In 
International Investment Law Emerging Jurisprudence Of International Investment Law III 
(2009) London: British Institute of International Comparative Law. 
Bogdandy A & Wolfrum R (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2006) Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Brownlie I Public International Law (2003) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Buckman G Global Trade: Past Mistakes, Future Choices (2013) London: Zed Books. 
Bulmer-Thomas V The Economic History of Latin America since Independence (2014) 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bulmer-Thomas V The Economic History of Latin America since Independence (2003) New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Cable J Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (2016) 
Chicago: Springer.  
Caliskan Y The Development of International Investment Law: Lessons from the OECD MAI 
Negotiations and Their Application to a Possible Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(2008) Boca Raton: Universal-Publishers. 
Collins D An Introduction to International Investment Law (2016) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
97 
 
Dolzer R & Stevens M Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995) Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
Dunning JH & Ludan SM Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (2008) 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Gazzini & De Brabandere E (eds.) International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and 
Obligations (2012) Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Graham-Yooll A Imperial Skirmishes: War and Gunboat Diplomacy in Latin America (2002) 
Chicago: Signal Books. 
Hindelang & Krajewski M (eds.) Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More 
Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified (2016) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lispson C Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (1985) Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 López Escarcena S Indirect Expropriation in International Law (2014) Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Martinez-Fraga PJ & Reetz CR The Public Purpose in International Law: Rethinking 
Regulatory Sovereignty in the Global Era (2015) New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Miles K The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the 
Safeguarding of Capital (2013) New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mouyal LW International Investment Law and the Right to Regulate: A Human Rights 
Perspective (2016) Abingdon: Routledge Publishers. 
Muchilinski PT Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2007) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Muchilisnki PT, Ortino F & Shcreuer C (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (2008) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mumbengegwi C Macroeconomic Structural Adjustment Policies in Zimbabwe (2001) New 
York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd. 
Newcombe & Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standard of Treatment 
(2009) Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
98 
 
Qureshi AH & Ziegler AR International Economic Law (2007) London: Sweet and Maxwell.  
Rubin SJ & Alexander DC (eds.) NAFTA and Investments (1995) Hague: Kluwer Law 
International. 
Rubin SJ & Alexander DC (eds.) NAFTA and Investments (1995) Hague: Kluwer Law 
International. 
Sachs L & Sauvant KP (eds.) The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Doubles Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (2009): Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Salacuse JW The Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual and 
International Frameworks for Foreign Capital (2013) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sauvant K P (ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2011-2012 (2013) 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sauvant KP & Sachs LE (eds.) The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (2009) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sauvant KP & Sachs LE The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (2009) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sauvant KP Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2011-12 (2013) Oxford: 
Oxford     University Press. 
Schill SW  International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Schill SW, Tams CJ & Hoffman R International Investment Law and Development: Bridging 
the Gap (2015) Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Shaw MN International Law (2008) New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Singh K & Ilge B (eds.) Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties: Critical Issues and Policy 
Choices (2016) Amsterdam: Both Ends, Madhyam and SOMO. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
99 
 
Sornarajah M Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment (2015) 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment (2010): New York Cambridge 
University Press. 
Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment (2015) New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Subedi SP International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) Portland: 
Hart Publishing. 
Titi C The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law (2014) Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Twomey M A Century of Foreign Investment in the Third World (2002) New York: Routledge. 
Wojnowska-Radzińska J The Right of an Alien to be Protected against Arbitrary Expulsion in 
International Law (2015) Leiden: Brill Nijhoff. 
  
Cases 
Azurix Corp v The Argentine Republic Award 14 July 2006. 
Campbell and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe 2009 (SADC (T) 03/2009) SADCT 1. 
CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, Award, 14 March 2003). 
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8. 
Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 1997. 
Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1. 
MTD v Chile (ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004). 
Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd v Republic of Ecuador LCIA Case No. UN3467. 
Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012 
– 12 Award 17 December 2015. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
100 
 
Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa 2009 ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/01 . 
Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada UNCITRAL final merits award 10 April 2001. 
Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Kazakhstan (ICSID Case 
No ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008). 
Rumeli v Kazakhstan Award 29 July 2008. 
Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, partial award 17 March 
2006. 
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2. 
Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6. 
White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award (30 
November 2011). 
 
Journal Articles  
Aaken V ‘International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract 
Theory Analysis’ (2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 507-538. 
Asante SKB ‘International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal’ (1988) 37 
International and Comparative Quarterly 558-628. 
Ayala Y S ‘Restoring the Balance in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Incorporating Human 
Rights Clauses’ (2009) 32 Artículo De Investigación/ Research Articles Revista de Derecho, 
Universidad del Norte 139-161. 
Borchard E ‘The Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens’ (1940) 38 Michigan Law Review 
445-461. 
Cole T ‘Boundaries of Most Favoured National Treatment in International Investment Law’ 
(2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 537-586. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
101 
 
Coyle JF & Yackee JW ‘Reviving the Treaty of Friendship: Enforcing International Investment 
Law in U.S. Courts’ (2016) 49 Arizona State Law Journal 61-114. 
Coyle JF ‘The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modem Era’ (2013) 51 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 302-359. 
Fox GA Future for International Investment? Modifying BITs to Drive Economic Development 
(2014) 46 Georgetown Journal of International Law 229-259. 
Friedman ‘A Flexible Arbitration for the Developing World: Piero Foresti and the Future of 
BITs in Global’ (2010) 7 South Brigham Young University International Law and Management 
Review 36-51. 
Gann PB ‘The US Bilateral Investment Treaty Program’ (1985) 21 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 373-460. 
Gudgeon SK ‘United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their Origin, 
Purposes, and General Treatment Standards’ (1986) 4 International Tax and Business Lawyer 
105-135. 
Guzman AT ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment treaties’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639-688. 
Henckels C ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality 
Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-state Arbitration’ (2012) 15 Journal of 
International Economic Law 223-255. 
Jaime M ‘Relying Upon Parties’ Interpretation in Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: Filling the Gaps in International Investment Agreements’ (2014) 46 Georgetown 
Journal of International Law 261-313. 
Ma D ' A BIT Unfair?: An Illustration of the Backlash Against International Arbitration in Latin 
America ' 2012 Journal of Dispute Resolution  572-589. 
Salacuse JW & Sullivan NP ‘Do BITs really Work: An Evaluation of BITs and their Grand 
Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67-130. 
Salacuse JW BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Impact on 
Foreign Investment’ (1990) 24 The International Lawyer 655-675. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
102 
 
Schreuer  C ‘Full Protection and Security’ (2010) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 
1-17. 
Schreuer C ‘Full Protection and Security’ 2010 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1-
17. 
Spears S ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment 
Agreements’ (2010) 16 Journal of International Economic Law 1037-1075. 
Van Harten G ‘Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion’ (2010) 2 
Trade Law and Development 19-57. 
Vandavelde KJ ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 University 
of California Davis Journal of International Law 157-194. 
 
Internet Sources 
Alfaro L, Chanda A, Kalemli-Ozcan S & Sayek S ‘How Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Promote Economic Growth? Exploring the Effects of Financial Markets on Linkages’ Harvard 
Business School Working Paper Summaries September 2006 available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-013.pdf (accessed 16 May 2017). 
Anne O. Krueger, Former First Deputy Managing Director, IMF 13 June 2006 available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/061306a.htm (accessed 25 April 2017). 
Australian Government Department of Health ‘Tobacco control: Policy and programs to 
improve the health of all Australians by eliminating or reducing their exposure to tobacco in 
all its forms’ available at http://www.health.gov.au/tobacco (accessed 20 May 2017). 
Berger A ‘Developing Countries and Future of International Investment Regime’ available at 
https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/giz2015-en-
Study_Developing_countries_and_the_future_of_the_international_investment_regime.pdf  
(accessed 27 March 2017). 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder N & Johnson L ‘Commentary to the Australian Model Investment 
Treaty’ November 2011 available at 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
103 
 
https://media.arbeiterkammer.at/wien/PDF/studien/Studie_Investitionsschutzabkommen_e
n.pdf (accessed 7 May 2017). 
Business Reporter ‘RBZ increases greenfield projects debt threshold’ The Herald Zimbabwe 
13 August 2015 available at http://www.herald.co.zw/rbz-increases-greenfield-projects-
debt-threshold/  (accessed 25 March 2017). 
Davarnejad L ‘Strengthening the Social Dimension of International Investment Agreements 
by Integrating Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises’ OECD Global Forum on 
International Investment March 2008 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40352144.pdf (accessed 7 May 2017). 
Dolzer R National ‘Treatment: New Developments’ available at 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36055356.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2015). 
Executive Summary of Government Position Paper ‘Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy 
Framework Review’ The Department of Trade & Industry 2009 available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/32386_961.pdf (accessed 5 May 2017). 
Filbri M & Praagman I  ‘International Investment and How they Reflect the Rights and 
Responsibilities of Different Stakeholders’ 1999 SOMO Amsterdam available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122164.pdf  (accessed 29 March 
2017). 
Gallagher K ‘Renegotiating bilateral treaties should not scare off investors’ The Business 
Report 4 November 2013 available at http://www.iol.co.za/business-
report/opinion/renegotiating-bilateral-treaties-should-not-scare-off-investors-1601411 
(accessed 5 May 2017). 
Gaukrodger D & Gordon K ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for The 
Investment Policy Community’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment March 
2012 available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
Göksel NK ‘Globalisation and the State’ 2004 available at http://sam.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/1.-NiluferKaracasuluGoksel.pdf  (accessed 25 April 2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
104 
 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5cd06b89-a957-43a6-9269-98f1adb1c6c4 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
Kazunga O ‘Edgars cedes $25m to workers’ scheme’ The Chronicle 16 May 2017 available at 
http://www.chronicle.co.zw/edgars-cedes-25m-to-workers-scheme/ (accessed 22 May 
2017). 
Khaliq A & Noy I ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Imperial Evidence from 
Sectoral Data in Indonesia’ March 2007 available at 
http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_07-26.pdf  (accessed 16 
May 2017). 
Kuwaza K ‘Indigenisation process gets murkier’ The Independent 24 March 2016 available at 
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/24/indigenisation-process-gets-murkier/ 
(accessed 22 May 2017). 
Lad-Ojomo O ‘What is the Distinction Between the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
and the Minimum Standard of Treatment Under Customary International Law’ available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.473.6169&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
Langalanga A ‘Imagining South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulatory Regime in a Global 
Context’ 2015 South African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper 214 available 
at https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/848-imagining-south-africa-s-foreign-
investment-regulatory-regime-in-a-global-context/file (accessed 25 April 2017). 
Legal Resources Centre, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, the Centre for Environmental 
Law and the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights 19 October 2009 
available at http://www.ciel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/SouthAfrica_Media_19Oct09.pdf (accessed 18 May 2017). 
Loungani P and Razin ‘A How Beneficial is FDI for Developing Countries International’ 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Finance and Development Quarterly Magazine 2001   
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/loungani.htm  (accessed 29 March 
2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
105 
 
Mail & Guardian Africa  ‘Zimbabwe economy still on downward spiral, as Mugabe signs law 
to stop mass lay-offs’ 28 August 2015 available at http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-08-28-
zimbabwe-still-on-downward-spiral-as-mugabe-signs-law-to-stop-mass-lay-offs  (accessed 
25 March 2017). 
Mann H 'The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law' November 2002 
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_right_to_regulate.pdf  (accessed 6 
May 2017). 
Matyszak D ‘Chaos Clarified – Zimbabwe’s “New” Indigenisation Framework’ Research and 
Advocacy Unit 2016 available at 
http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Chaos%20Clarified.pdf (accessed 20 May 
2017). 
OECD ‘"Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” In International Investment Law’ 
September 2004 available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-
2004_4.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017). 
OEDC ‘Most-favoured Nation Treatment in International Investment Law’ Working Papers 
on International Investment February 2004 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/wp-2004_2.pdf  (accessed 28 April 2017). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEDC) Investment Division 
‘Dispute settlement provisions in international investment agreements: A large sample 
survey’ 2012 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
Pelc KJ ‘Does the International Investment Regime Induce Frivolous Litigation?’  May 2016 
available at http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/42486/frivolity.pdf (accessed 21 May 2017). 
Perera AR ‘The Role and Implications of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050718.2000.9986567 (accessed 25 April 
2017). 
Peterson LE ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties – Implications for Sustainable Development and 
Options for Regulation’ 2007 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference Report available at 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
106 
 
http://www.fes-
globalization.org/publications/ConferenceReports/FES%20CR%20Berlin_Peterson.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
Peterson LE ‘Indonesia ramps up termination of BITs – and kills survival clause in one such 
treaty – but faces new $600 mil claim from Indian mining investor’ Bilaterals 20 November 
2015 available at  http://bilaterals.org/?indonesia-ramps-up-termination-of  (accessed 25 
April 2017). 
Rosert D ‘The Stakes Are High: A Review of Financial Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 
International Institute for Sustainable Development July 2014 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/stakes-are-high-review-financial-costs-
investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017). 
Salomon C & Friedrich S ‘How Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Affect Arbitration’ Practical Law Arbitration 2013 available at 
https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/favoured-nation-clauses-arbitration (accessed 28 April 
2017). 
Sauvant KP (ed.) ‘International Investment Agreements: Key Issues’ UNCTAD October 2010 
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit200410_en.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017). 
Schreuer C ‘Investments, International Protection’ January 2011 available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/investments_Int_Protection.pdf (accessed 
29 April 2017). 
Sforza M & Vallianatos M ‘Chemical Firm Uses Trade Pact to Contest Environmental Law’ 
(1997) available at 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212/45381.html (accessed 21 
May 2017). 
Shreuer C ‘Investments, International Protection’ available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/investments_Int_Protection.pdf (accessed 
25 April 2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
107 
 
Sibanda G ‘Zimbabwe: Government signs 54 trade pacts’ The Herald 22 June 2015 available 
at http://www.bilaterals.org/?zimbabwe-govt-signs-54-trade-pacts (accessed 26 April 
2017). 
Slattery G ‘White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India - India breaches 
Australian/Indian BIT’ Squire Patton Boggs June 2012 available at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5cd06b89-a957-43a6-9269-98f1adb1c6c4 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
Sprenger H & Boersma B ‘The Importance of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) When 
Investing in Emerging Markets’ American Bar Business Law Today March 2014 available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/03/01_sprenger.html (accessed 23 
April 2017). 
The Department of Trade ‘South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment’ June 2003 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee-strategy.pdf (accessed 5 May 
2017). 
The Department of Trade and Industry of South Africa giving a general overview of 
economic empowerment, available at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp (accessed 5 May 2017). 
Thornycroft P and Laing A ‘Land grabs’ The Telegraph 28 February 2015 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/active/11442408/Zimbabwes-white-farmers-targeted-for-new-
Mugabe-land-grabs.html (accessed 26 March 2017). 
Twomey MJ ‘A Century of Foreign Investment in Mexico’ UM-Dearborn Economics Working 
Paper 2009 available at http://www-
personal.umd.umich.edu/~mtwomey/econhelp/MexInv.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017). 
UNCTAD ‘National Treatment’ IIAs Issues Paper Series May 1999 available 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/psiteiitd11v4.en.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017). 
UNCTAD ‘World Investment Report 2016 Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges’ available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_Overview_en.pdf (accessed 25 April 
2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
108 
 
UNCTAD 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements' 2012 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf  (accessed 14 May 2017). 
UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/INVESTMENT%20POLICY%20FR
AMEWORK%202015%20WEB_VERSION.pdf (accessed 13 May 2017). 
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub: Zimbabwe’s Bilateral Investment Treaties available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/233#iiaInnerMenu  (accessed 26 
April 2017). 
Waldoch M & Onoszko M ‘Poland plans to cancel Bilateral Investment Treaties with EU’ 
Bloomberg 26 February 2016 available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
02-25/poland-seeks-to-end-bilateral-investment-deals-with-eu-members (accessed 25 April 
2017). 
Widyatmoko W ‘Indonesia: The end of Bilateral Investment Treaties?’ Global Arbitration 
News 29 May 2015 available at https://globalarbitrationnews.com/indonesia-the-end-of-
bilateral-investment-treaties-the-end-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-20150202/ (accessed 
25 April 2017). 
Willard R & Morreau S ‘The Canadian Model BIT – A Step in the Right Direction for Canadian 
Investment in Africa?’ Kluwer Arbitration Blog 18 July 2015 available at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/07/18/the-canadian-model-bit-a-step-in-the-right-
direction-for-canadian-investment-in-africa/ (accessed 8 June 2017). 
World Nuclear Association ‘Nuclear Power in Germany’ available at http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/germany.aspx (accessed 20 
May 2017). 
Zenda C ‘Zimbabwe needs to do more to attract investment’ Financial Gazette 21 January 
2016 available at http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/zimbabwe-needs-to-do-more-to-
attract-investmentbmi/  (accessed 7 March 2017). 
  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
109 
 
Legislation  
South Africa 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act No. 49 of 2009. 
Protection of Investment Act No.22 of 2015. 
 
Zimbabwe 
Exchange Control Act [Chapter 22:05] Act 2006. 
Immigration Act [Chapter 4:02] 2001. 
Indigenisation Act [Chapter 14:33] 2007. 
Joint Ventures Act [Chapter 22:22] 2015. 
Procurement Act [Chapter 22:14] 2001. 
Special Economic Zones Act [Chapter 14:34] 2016. 
Zimbabwe Investment Authority Act [Chapter 14:30] 2006. 
 
Policy Papers 
Bernasconi-Ostewalder N ‘Rethinking Investment Related Dispute Settlement’ 2016 
International Institute for Sustainable Development Investment Treaty News. 
Carim X ‘International Investment Agreements and Africa’s Structural Transformation: A 
Perspective of South Africa’ 2015 Investment Policy Brief.  
Davarnejad L ‘Strengthening the Social Dimension of International Investment Agreements 
by Integrating Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises’ 2008 OECD Global Forum on 
International Investment VII. 
Sauvant KP and Unuver G Can Host Countries Have Legitimate Expectations? Colombia FDI 
Perspectives 2016. 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
110 
 
 
 
 
Theses  
Kondo T ‘Investment Law in a Globalised Environment: A Proposal for a New Investment 
Regime in Zimbabwe’ Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of the Western Cape 2017. 
 
Treaties 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership 
(2006). 
Agreement between Republic of Zimbabwe and Federal Republic of Germany concerning 
The Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1995). 
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of Belize for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1982). 
Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (1996). 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the 
Sultanate of Oman on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2004). 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government 
of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(2009). 
Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Zimbabwe on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1996). 
Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the 
Republic of Zimbabwe and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1996). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
111 
 
Canada Model Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (2004). 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between European Union and Canada 
(2016). 
Indian Model Text of Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement (2003). 
Southern African Development Community Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template 
(2012). 
Southern African Development Community Protocol on Finance and Investment (2006). 
Southern African Development Community Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-operation on 
Investment) (2016). 
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment (2008). 
 
 
 
Working Papers 
 
Bottini G ‘Strengthening the Global Trade and Investment System for Sustainable 
Development’ 2015 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and 
World Economic Forum Think Piece. 
Yu V & Marshall F ‘Investor Obligations and Host State Policy Space’ 2008 2nd Annual Forum 
of Developing Country Investment Negotiators IISD Working Paper Marrakesh.  
 
 
 
